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THE MYTH OF COPYRIGHT'S FAIR USE
DOCTRINE AS A PROTECTOR OF FREE SPEECH
Lee Ann W. Lockridget
Abstract
This article debunks the myth that the fair use doctrine exists to
protect the freedom of speech within copyright. Using the history of
fair use in the courts and in Congress, as well as recent case law, the
Article demonstrates that fair use is not, and never has been, intended
or designed to restrain copyright in the face of the First Amendment.
The conflict between copyright and free speech could be lessened by
reforming the balance of interests within fair use to eliminate the
focus on commercial use and to expand the understanding of the
broader public-benefit purpose underlying the Supreme Court's
analysis of transformative uses. This broadening of what constitutes a
'fair" purpose and character of a use would create an opportunity
forjudicial balancing of the interests promoted by both copyright and
the First Amendment.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court stated in Eldred v. Ashcroft that copyright
stands apart from most speech restrictions with respect to First
Amendment scrutiny due, in part, to copyright's promotion of speech
through the creation and publication of expression.' The Supreme
Court has also told us on more than one occasion that copyright
includes built-in safeguards protecting the First Amendment freedom
of expression, namely the fair use defense and the distinction between
idea and expression.2 We are told that these two accommodations are
"generally adequate to address" First Amendment concerns, although
they do not go so far as to make copyright "categorically immune"
from a First Amendment challenge: 3 "[W]hen, as in this case,
Congress has not altered the traditional contours of copyright
protection, further First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary."4 As
Justice Breyer noted in his dissent in Eldred, the Court in that
sentence provides questions, not answers. What are the "traditional
contours" of copyright, and have they been altered? If the
interpretation of the First Amendment matures in some way, should
that not rightfully reopen the question of the interaction between
copyright and free speech? And to the extent that the "traditional
contours" of copyright have changed, will the Court actually be
willing to scrutinize the relationship of copyright and free speech?
In this article, I focus upon the fair use defense as an asserted
safeguard of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the First
Amendment, leaving to one side the idea-expression dichotomy, the
1. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (citing Harper & Row, Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)).
2. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221; Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560. See also Nihon Keizai
Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 74 (2d Cir. 1999) ("We have repeatedly
rejected First Amendment challenges to injunctions from copyright infringement on the ground
that First Amendment concerns are protected by and coextensive with the fair use doctrine.").
3. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221.
4. Id.
5. As stated by Justice Breyer:
We cannot avoid the need to examine the statute carefully by saying that
"Congress has not altered the traditional contours of copyright protection," for
the sentence points to the question, rather than the answer. Nor should we avoid
that examination here. That degree of judicial vigilance-at the far outer
boundaries of the Clause-is warranted if we are to avoid the monopolies and
consequent restrictions of expression that the Clause, read consistently with the
First Amendment, seeks to preclude.
Id. at 264 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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other safeguard heralded by the Court.6 Following a brief survey of
some basic principles underlying copyright and First Amendment
protection and the manner in which the First Amendment can restrain
copyright, I explore the question of whether the fair use doctrine was
intended or designed to perform that function of restraint. The answer
to that question is no. Despite the Court's assertion that the fair use
doctrine safeguards the freedom of speech within the realm of
copyright, I find that under modem First Amendment jurisprudence
the structure and current interpretation of fair use miss the mark.7 As
codified in section 107 of the Copyright Act, the fair use doctrine
directs courts to consider a matter that would be an improper
consideration in any other First-Amendment-sensitive analysis,
6. Other scholars have begun the critique of relying heavily on the modem distinction
between ideas and expression to protect First Amendment rights. See, e.g., Neil W. Netanel,
Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 13-20 (2001);
Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the Idea/Expression Dichotomy and
Copyright in a Work's "Total Concept and Feel," 38 EMORY L.J. 393, 394-95 (1989). Further
exploration of the topic in a manner parallel to the thesis I advance here would appropriately be
the subject for an entirely separate article.
I also leave to one side the important debate on the sufficiency of modem fair use's
performance of its internal copyright duty of maintaining an appropriate balance between new
creativity and existing creativity mindful of copyright's Constitutional goal of promoting the
public interest through encouraging the production of new creative works. Similarly, I do not
discuss the arguable economic role of fair use as a means of addressing market failure. See, e.g.,
Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the
Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982). Instead, I limit my
discussion and analysis here to the interaction of fair use with the First Amendment.
The work of many scholars enables me to move quickly through the initial question
of the interaction of copyright with the First Amendment and to focus instead on the specific
question of fair use. Among those scholars and their relevant works are: Paul Goldstein,
Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983 (1970); David McGowan, Why the
First Amendment Cannot Dictate Copyright Policy, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 281 (2004); Netanel,
supra; Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free
Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1970); Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of
Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionality, 112 YALE LJ. 1 (2002); Rebecca Tushnet,
Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What Copyright has in Common with Anti-
Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance Reform, and Telecommunications Regulation, 42 B.C.
L. REV. 1 (2000); William W. Van Alstyne, Reconciling What the First Amendment Forbids
With What the Copyright Clause Permits: A Summary Explanation and Review, 66 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 225 (2003); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property:
Some Thoughts After Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 Hous. L. REV. 697 (2003);
Alfred C. Yen, Eldred, The First Amendment, and Aggressive Copyright Claims, 40 HOUS. L.
REV. 673 (2003). This is by no means an all-inclusive list.
7. In this article I apply the Supreme Court's current jurisprudence governing the
interpretation of the First Amendment and its application to speech restrictions. I do not herein
endorse that interpretation, nor do I purport to provide my own normative vision of the First
Amendment.
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namely the profit-making purpose of an allegedly infringing use.8 In
addition, although the Court's approach to fair use in Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.9 shifted the fair use emphasis away from the
commerciality of a use, its new focus, transformative use, also
diminishes the potential for the first factor to be utilized in
recognizing a free speech interest within a fair use defense.
Transformation, as contrasted with reproduction or distribution or
another non-transformative use of a work, does not hold any greater
inherent First Amendment value.
The Supreme Court and lower courts could acknowledge that
fair use does not function as a protector of free speech and instead
institute separate First Amendment review in appropriate cases. In
light of Eldred, that seems highly unlikely.'0 As a result, further
attention to the fair use doctrine is needed. Enabling the fair use
doctrine to perform its assigned First Amendment role would require
reform. Specifically, I argue that fair use should not focus on the
commerciality of a defendant's use in the context of purpose and
character of a use. As such, I recommend that Congress modify the
statutory text so as to redirect the attention of the courts away from
profit motive. Similarly, the courts should not myopically view fair
use as limited to transformative use. A wider range of uses should be
understood to serve the public interests vindicated through both the
First Amendment and copyright, and Campbell itself implicates a
wider range of uses when it is read broadly rather than narrowly.
These changes will not eliminate the conflict between copyright and
the First Amendment; nothing ever will. Instead, such changes create
a real opportunity for judicial balancing of interests so that both
copyright and free speech interests can be more fully considered
within fair use.
8. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) provides: "In determining whether the use made of a work in
any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include - (1) the purpose and
character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes."
9. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579, 583-85 (1994).
10. The Court in Eldred was comfortable asserting that the idea-expression distinction
and the fair use defense are "generally adequate to address" First Amendment concerns, without
any real support, demonstrating a lack of interest in further scrutinizing this issue. See Eldred,
537 U.S. at 221.
[Vol. 24
2007] THE MYTH OF COPYRIGHT'S FAIR USE DOCTRINE 35
II. COPYRIGHT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. Copyright's Constitutional Basis
Copyright grants to authors and their successors-in-interest
certain exclusive rights in original expression. 1 The scope of federal
copyright law has grown over the more than 200 years since the first
federal copyright law took effect in 1790.12 For example, the first
federal copyright law protected maps, charts, and books against
unauthorized printing, reprinting, publishing, vending, and importing.
13 It provided a fourteen-year term of protection, with one possible
renewal term. 14 The 1976 Copyright Act, which remains in effect
today with amendments, protects all "original works of authorship
fixed in a tangible medium of expression"' 5 from unauthorized
reproduction, distribution, public performance, and public display,
and provides the copyright owner with the exclusive right to create
derivative works based on the copyrighted work. 16 The current term
of protection is the life of the author plus seventy years thereafter, or
for works for hire, ninety-five years from publication. 
1 7
Congress's authority to enact federal copyright laws arises from
an express power in Article I of the Constitution: "The Congress shall
have Power... To Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."' 8 The utilitarian
philosophical rationale of both our patent and copyright law finds
voice in the preambular language "to promote the progress of science
11. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102-106A (2000).
12. Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Stat. 124 (1790).
13. Id. §§ 1-2.
14. Id. § 2. An 1802 revision added prints to the subject matter protected by copyright,
Copyright Act of April 29, 1802, ch. 36, 2 Stat. 171 (1802), and an 1831 revision added musical
compositions and extended the initial term to 28 years, Act of February 3, 1831, chap. 16, 4 Stat.
436 (1831). The 1870 Copyright Revision Act, which continued the 1790 Act's separate
recitation of rights from the list of infringing acts for the first time associated the right to copy
with books, but its infringement section did not include the right to copy with respect to books.
See Act of July 8, 1870, chap. 230, 16 Stat. 198-217, §§ 86, 99-100 (1870). The 1909 Copyright
Act protected "all of the writings of an author" and protected all such works from unauthorized
printing, reprinting, publishing, copying, and vending. Copyright Act of March 4, 1909, 35 Stat.
1075 (1909). For further discussion of the expansion of U.S. copyright via statutory revision, see
L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REv. 1, 40-44 (1987).
15. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
16. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
17. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000). For works for hire, the term is either 95 years from first
publication or 120 years from creation, whichever is shorter.
18. U.S. CONST, art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (Copyright Clause).
36 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
and useful arts." In using this language, the Founders appear to have
justified the grant of a limited monopoly in the writings of authors
and the discoveries of inventors by referring to the greater public
good presumed to arise from that monopoly - specifically, the
"progress of science and useful arts."' 9 In particular, the utilitarian
link exists in the presumption that if the law provides for exclusive
rights in writings and discoveries, then the authors and inventors of
those writings and discoveries will have greater motivation to write
and discover than they would otherwise have. Under this theory, with
greater motivation more writing and inventing will occur, and this
greater productivity will benefit the public through progress in
science and useful arts.2°
The utilitarian basis for U.S. copyright law underlies, to no small
extent, the distinction between ideas and expression as well as the fair
use doctrine. The 1976 Copyright Act expressly provides for a
distinction to be made between protected expression and the ideas
embodied therein, and it excludes ideas from any copyright
protection.2' While facts are not specifically covered by the statutory
language, the 1991 case of Feist Publications Inc. v. Rural Telephone
Service Co. 22 made it abundantly clear that facts embodied within
copyright-protected expression are treated the same as ideas: they are
excluded from copyright protection. This distinction between
protected expression and unprotected ideas and facts (the "idea-
expression dichotomy" or the "idea-expression distinction") provides
a general limitation on the scope of copyright protection in a given
19. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429, 477
(1984); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985); Wendy J.
Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and
Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1437-39 (1989).
20. This utilitarian basis for copyright, while not absolutely controlling of U.S. copyright
law and policy, has affected the law in this country. See generally PAUL GOLDSTEIN,
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND PRACTICE § 1 (2001). The effect can be
seen when our laws are compared to the copyright laws of countries asserting a foundation in
author's rights, a more natural rights-based conception. Id. A notable divergence between our
system and those systems traditionally based in an author's rights philosophy is the absence in
the U.S. of a broad, express collection of moral rights in works of authorship. See generally
John H. Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1023 (1976). The
moral rights of the author provide, in general terms, the right of attribution (or non-attribution)
of the work to the author and the right of integrity of the work, as well as the right of
divulgation. In some nations, such as France and Italy, the moral rights secured to the author
under the law are perpetual and largely inalienable. See id. at 1044.
21. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). While the distinction between ideas and expression
first appeared in the statute in 1976, the distinction was not new to copyright law. See, e.g.,
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954).
22. Feist Publ'ns Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344 (1991).
[Vol. 24
2007] THE MYTH OF COPYRIGHT'S FAIR USE DOCTRINE 37
work of authorship, which means it is also critical to a second
author's ability to use copyright-protected works in creating new
works. By ensuring that the ideas and facts contained within
copyright-protected expression cannot be monopolized by the author
or other copyright owner, copyright law maintains those ideas and
facts as the building blocks available to new works of authorship. In
doing so, copyright law does not allow copyright protection to
discourage further use of those ideas and facts. This lack of protection
contributes to progress in the arts and sciences, which is thought to
benefit the greater public interest.
A second general limitation on the rights granted to a copyright
owner under U.S. law is the fair use doctrine. 3 The 1976 Act codified
fair use in section 107,24 although the concept was not new to U.S.
law. 25 In general terms, as stated in an older treatise on copyright and
later endorsed by the Supreme Court, fair use is "a privilege in others
than the owner of a copyright to use the copyrighted material in a
reasonable manner without his consent., 26  That general
characterization, while helpful, no longer controls the scope of the
doctrine. Part IV.A. of this article sets forth the details of the current
doctrine of fair use.
23. Additional, more specific limitations on a copyright owner's rights may be found
elsewhere in U.S. copyright law, including the first sale doctrine of § 109 and the various
exceptions to the public performance and display rights found in § 110. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 109-
110(2000).
24. Section 107 of the Copyright Act provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords
or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining
whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to
be considered shall include -
(I) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such
finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
25. See infra Part III.A-D.
26. HORACE G. BALL, LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944), quoted
in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985).
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The connection of fair use to the utilitarian basis of copyright
exists in the understanding that little in this world, including the
creative world of authorship, is completely new.27 All works find
some antecedent in an earlier creative work, whether the author
consciously understands that antecedent basis or the connection is
instead subconscious. By opening the extent to which a new work of
authorship may draw from older works, to include not only unlimited
uses of works no longer protected by copyright but also limited uses
of preexisting works still protected by copyright, fair use expands
creative possibilities for new authorship. 28 In so doing, fair use can
encourage authors to take advantage of those creative possibilities,
which in turn supports copyright's Constitutional goal of promoting
progress in the arts and sciences for the benefit of the public.
Under our law, copyright's primary goal is to protect the interest
of the public in encouraging progress in literature, arts, science, and
other cultural and intellectual pursuits. 29 Private benefit to an author is
the vehicle by which copyright promotes that public interest. The
idea-expression distinction and the fair use doctrine, two means by
which a second author or other user of a work may re-utilize material
from a copyright-protected work, are exceptions to the copyright
monopoly that also promote the same public interest. Moreover, in
Eldred the Court tied the idea-expression distinction and the fair use
doctrine to the public interest promoted by the First Amendment.3 ° So
27. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) ("[A]s
Justice Story explained, '[iln truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be, few,
if any, things, which in an abstract sense, are strictly new and original throughout,"' (quoting
Emerson v. Davies, 8 F.Cas. 615, 619 (No. 4,436) (C.C.D. Mass. 1845)), and "[There is an]
inherent tension in the need simultaneously to protect copyrighted material and to allow others
to build upon it [as noted by Lord Ellenborough] when he wrote, 'while I shall think myself
bound to secure every man in the enjoyment of his copy-right, one must not put manacles upon
science.' (quoting Cary v. Kearsley, 4 Esp. 168, 170, 170 Eng. Rep. 679, 681 (K.B. 1803))).
28. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the
Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REv. 149, 157-58 (1992).
29. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429, 477
(1984); Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 546.
30. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003):
[C]opyright's purpose is to promote the creation and publication of free
expression....
In addition to spurring the creation and publication of new expression,
copyright law contains built-in First Amendment accommodations. First, it
distinguishes between ideas and expression and makes only the latter eligible for
copyright protection....
Second, the "fair use" defense allows the public to use not only facts and ideas
contained in a copyrighted work, but also expression itself in certain
circumstances.
[Vol. 24
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while the Court in Eldred gave Congress wide latitude in
implementing copyright protection under its Copyright Clause power,
it also elevated to constitutional importance the idea-expression
distinction and the fair use doctrine by relying on both the copyright
power and the First Amendment.3 1 In so doing, it acknowledged that a
broad public interest underlies both doctrines - a public interest
invested with concerns related to both "progress in science and the
useful arts" and the freedom of speech under the First Amendment.3 2
B. Current First Amendment Jurisprudence
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." 33 The development of First Amendment free speech and
free press jurisprudence 34 has moved beyond the raw text, which
provides simply that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press. 35 Despite Justice Black's rhetoric
emphasizing the bright-line nature of that language,36 Congress and
the several states have passed numerous laws that restrain speech and
yet manage to coexist with the First Amendment. We have laws
restricting defamatory speech known to be false,37 speech disclosing




33. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
34. Throughout the article I generally refer only to free speech when referring to the
relevant right protected by the First Amendment. In almost all instances, the same concern
would apply to the freedom of the press when "the press" is the copyright defendant.
35. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
36. See, e.g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 157 (1959) (Black, J., concurring):
Certainly the First Amendment's language leaves no room for inference that
abridgments of speech and press can be made just because they are slight. That
Amendment provides, in simple words, that "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." I read "no law .. . abridging"
to mean no law abridging.
37. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964); Beauhamais v.
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
38. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (2000) (federal statute proscribing and providing for
criminal punishment of the theft of a trade secret, including theft accomplished via disclosure of
the trade secret); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3(a) (amended 1985) (uniform act adopted by
more than 40 states, wherein civil liability may be imposed for the disclosure of a trade secret).
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matters, 39 and more. Thus it is clear that not all governmental
restrictions on communications impermissibly abridge the protected
freedom of speech and press.4 °
Modem First Amendment scholarship traces two dominant
purposes for the protection of freedom of speech: ensuring the
individual freedom of self-expression and safeguarding our
democratic form of government by providing for freedom of
communication amongst the citizenry.41 Neither theory can perfectly
explain all the speech freedoms the Court has guarded over the years;
each appears to be playing a role.42 The Court has attempted to divine
43the extent of the amendment's reach by applying these purposes.
The self-realization theory holds that individuals need to be able
to express themselves freely in order to fully imagine and reach their
full potential. 4 Authors need freedom in order to express their own
39. See, e.g., United States v. Jeter, 775 F.2d 670, 679 (6th Cir. 1985) (upholding the
constitutionality of a criminal obstruction-of-justice statute as applied to a defendant who
improperly disclosed federal grand jury information).
40. At least this is true under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. Even Justice Black
voted to uphold certain restraints on speech, despite the absolutist position he set forth in Smith
v. California. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 517 (1969)
(Black, J., dissenting):
While I have always believed that under the First and Fourteenth Amendments
neither the State nor the Federal Government has any authority to regulate or
censor the content of speech, I have never believed that any person has a right to
give speeches or engage in demonstrations where he pleases and when he
pleases.
See also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 27 (1971) (Justice Black joining Justice Blackmun's
dissent from the Court's ruling that Cohen's First Amendment rights were implicated, which
dissent characterized Cohen's use of the statement "Fuck the Draft" on his jacket as "mainly
conduct, and little speech."); supra note 36.
41. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 3 (2d ed. 2003); ZECHARIAH
CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 33 (1941):
The First Amendment protects two kinds of interests in free speech. There is
an individual interest, the need of many men to express their opinions on matters
vital to them if life is to be worth living, and a social interest in the attainment of
truth, so that the country may not only adopt the wisest course of action but carry
it out in the wisest way.
See also ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
63, 88-89 (1948) (maintaining that the only purpose of the First Amendment's freedom of
speech is the protection of public discussion in support of our structure of self-government, but
noting that this sole purpose supporting the public need includes other narrower interests within
it).
42. See FARBER, supra note 41, at 3-8.
43. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 761-65 (1976).
44. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
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vision, which in turn can benefit the public through cultural
enrichment. Freedom of individual expression also underlies an
individual search for truth. By being free to express any idea,
individuals are encouraged to contribute to the "marketplace of ideas"
from which individuals and society may choose in the search for
truth.45  The "marketplace of ideas" premise underlies both the
individual self-expression purpose as well as the collective public
discourse purpose. Under the collective public discourse purpose,
First Amendment protections do not aim to protect individual self-
realization. Instead, First Amendment protections exist to protect our
system of democracy by ensuring that public decisionmaking is
informed to the fullest extent possible.4 6 Speech restrictions should
not be erected within the area of public discourse, as that speech has
"constitutional value because [it] is regarded as constituting
participation in the process of democratic self-governance.,
47
With the purposes of First Amendment protection operating
largely, although not completely, as a subtext, two questions in
particular resurface throughout the Court's jurisprudence: (1) what
sort of communication constitutes the protected "speech" or "press,"
and (2) what does it mean to impermissibly "abridge" a freedom.
Answers to those questions help guide the assessment of the
constitutionality of a law's impact on communicative freedom.
[The Founders] believed that the final end of the State was to make men free to
develop their faculties; and that in its government the deliberative forces should
prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a means.
They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of
liberty.
Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)
(holding unconstitutional the criminal punishment of mere advocacy of lawless action that is not
likely to incite the action, and overruling Whitney in doing so, but not disputing Brandeis's
discussion of the purpose of the First Amendment). See also Nimmer, supra note 6, at 1188.
45. See Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003) (noting that an overbroad law
restricting speech may cause persons to "abstain from protected speech - harming not only
themselves but society as a whole, which is deprived of an uninhibited marketplace of ideas.").
46. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831 (1995) (tying First
Amendment freedoms to well-informed public discourse):
Our understanding of the complex and multifaceted nature of public discourse
has not embraced such a contrived description of the marketplace of ideas. If the
topic of debate is, for example, racism, then exclusion of several views on that
problem is just as offensive to the First Amendment as exclusion of only one.
See also Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988) (relying on criticism's value
to public discourse in protecting Hustler Magazine's speech); MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 41, at
88-89, 94; Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4
(2000).
47. Post, supra note 46, at 4.
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1. Communications Protected as "Speech"
Modem free speech jurisprudence depends largely on
categorization of both the communication or activity affected by a
restriction 48 and the nature of the restriction.49 Categorization of the
communication ostensibly helps answer the question of whether it is
"speech" that falls fully within the protected freedom, 50  and
categorization of the speech restriction determines what type of
review a court will apply. 51 After categorization of the speech and the
restriction, the court assesses the interest promoted by the restriction
and the necessary fit between the speech restriction and the interest
being promoted.52 This assessment operates largely as a balancing of
interests in an effort to determine whether the restriction
constitutionally or unconstitutionally abridges the freedom of
speech.53
The major speech categories addressed by modem First
Amendment jurisprudence, including both protected and unprotected
speech categories, are obscenity, incitement and fighting words, false
48. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-68 (1983) (analyzing
whether a pamphlet was fully protected speech or instead commercial speech entitled to
qualified First Amendment protection); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980) (setting forth an analysis for a restriction on commercial
speech that provides qualified First Amendment protection to commercial speech); A Book
Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Att'y Gen., 383 U.S. 413, 418
(1966) (providing a three-part test that may be used to categorize sexual speech as either
unprotected obscenity or protected speech); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957)
(holding that obscenity, although it is a form of speech, is not protected speech under the First
Amendment because it has no redeeming social value).
49. Compare Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (detailing the
three-part analysis for a content-neutral time, place, or manner speech restriction), with Boos v.
Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321, 329 (1988) (providing a two-part test for a content-based restriction).
See also Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom of Speech:
Problems in the Supreme Court's Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 49, 49 (2000) (noting the
Court's reliance on the categorization of speech restrictions into content-based restrictions and
content-neutral restrictions).
50. See, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974) (providing an analysis
for when conduct is expressive and is to be protected as speech); A Book Named "John
Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure," 383 U.S. at 418 (providing an analysis for when
expression is protected speech and when it is unprotected obscenity); Roth, 354 U.S. at 489
(same).
51. Compare Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (content-neutral speech restriction), with Boos, 485
U.S. at 321, 329 (content-based speech restriction).
52. See, e.g., Ward, 491 U.S. at 796-803; Boos, 485 U.S. at 321-29; Central Hudson, 447
U.S. at 568-71.
53. See, e.g., Ward, 491 U.S. at 796-803; Boos, 485 U.S. at 321-39; Central Hudson, 447
U.S. at 568-71; Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 765-70 (1976).
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speech and libel, commercial speech, and, finally, what we might
categorize as core speech, which includes both expressive conduct
and more traditional forms of expression.5 4 Copyright's fair use
doctrine does not specifically implicate obscene, fighting, or violence-
inciting speech, as the courts have attempted to avoid judging the
fairness of a use based on its emotive content or the artistic "value" of
the allegedly infringing work. 55 Whether speech is libelous does not
affect whether it falls within fair use or the scope of another's
copyright. Copyright and fair use also do not directly implicate any
aspect of expressive conduct that differs from other core speech.56
Accordingly, my analysis focuses only on core speech, excluding
expressive conduct, and commercial speech.
2. Impermissible Abridgment of the Freedom of Speech
Restrictions on fully protected core speech are categorized as
either content-based restrictions or content-neutral restrictions.57
Content-based restrictions survive First Amendment scrutiny if the
restriction is necessary to achieve a compelling governmental interest
and the restriction is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.
58
Content-neutral restrictions, which are often referred to as time, place,
or manner restrictions, must naturally be justified without reference to
the content of the regulated speech, be narrowly tailored to serve a
54. See, e.g., A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure," 383
U.S. at 418 (obscenity); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969) (incitement and
fighting words); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (false speech); N.Y.
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266-70 (1964) (libel); Virginia State Bd of Pharmacy, 425
U.S. at 761-70 (commercial speech); Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11 (expressive conduct); Boos,
485 U.S. at 318 (characterizing protection for political speech and speech on public issues as the
"core of the First Amendment").
55. There is a general prohibition on assessing artistic value for purposes of determining
copyright protection. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 582-83
(1994); Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903). Courts have, however,
implicated value judgments within the first fair use factor, the purpose and character of the use.
See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 972 F.2d 1429, 1435-36 (6th Cir. 1992), revd,
510 U.S. 569 (1994).
56. A defendant must be found to have used expression in order for a prima facie case of
infringement to be made, following which fair use might be analyzed. That use might come in
the form of any of the exclusive rights under section 106. Regardless of the exclusive right
implicated, copyright infringement claims expressly govern the use of expression. No additional
interpretive link need be made in copyright from conduct to expressive or communicative
purpose or impact. Moreover, even though a defendant's conduct in reproducing, distributing, or
otherwise infringing a work will certainly be part of an infringement claim, copyright law is
certainly not a generally applicable conduct regulation. See, e.g., Netanel, supra note 6, at 43-
45.
57. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791; Boos, 485 U.S. at 319-21.
58. Boos, 485 U.S. at 321.
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significant governmental interest, and must leave open ample
alternative channels for communication of the information.5 9
The Court categorizes commercial speech regulations apart from
core speech regulations, despite the fact that the very category of
commercial speech is based in large part on content, 60 and the
governmental purpose for regulating commercial speech is often
content-based. 6 1 The Court's commercial speech jurisprudence
indicates that it protects commercial speech for purposes unrelated to
self-expression or self-realization, which in turn sets commercial
speech and its regulation apart from core speech:
It is a matter of public interest that [private economic] decisions, in
the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the
free flow of commercial information is indispensable. And if it is
indispensable to the proper allocation of resources in a free
enterprise system, it is also indispensable to the formation of
intelligent opinions as to how that system ought to be regulated or
altered. Therefore, even if the First Amendment were thought to be
primarily an instrument to enlighten public decisionmaking in a
democracy, we could not say that the free flow of information does
not serve that goal.62
Public discourse theory clearly resonates with the Court's
rationale for including commercial speech within the "speech"
protected by the First Amendment. This distinction in purpose behind
the protection for commercial speech has resulted in a difference in
the Court's scrutiny of commercial speech restrictions.63 Restrictions
on commercial speech must advance a substantial governmental
interest and be closely tailored to serve that governmental interest.
64
59. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.
60. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-68 (1983) (identifying
commercial speech in part by its content, namely, reference to a particular product within the
speech).
61. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 749-50, 766-69 (1976) (noting that the state law under review banned only pharmacist
advertising containing particular content, namely prescription drug prices).
62. Id. at 765 (citations omitted).
63. See id. at 771-72.
64. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980):
The State must assert a substantial interest to be achieved by restrictions on
commercial speech. Moreover the regulatory technique must be in proportion to
that interest. The limitation on expression must be designed carefully to achieve
the State's goal. Compliance with this requirement may be measured by two
criteria. First, the restriction must directly advance the state interest involved; the
regulation may not be sustained if it provides only ineffective or remote support
for the government's purpose. Second, if the governmental interest could be
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Commercial speech that is misleading or regarding unlawful activity
does not gain even this intermediate level of protection.65
Even with respect to nonmisleading commercial speech, a
comparison between the Court's tests for content-based and content-
neutral speech regulations and the test for a commercial speech
regulation demonstrates that commercial speech receives less
protection than does core speech. The commercial speech analysis is
close to that for content-neutral core speech restrictions, but because
content can play a role in a commercial speech regulation, and
because no alternate-communications-channel analysis is required,
commercial speech still falls somewhat below core speech with
respect to the scrutiny and protection provided.66 Thus, the distinction
between "commercial" speech and other protected speech creates a
zone where government regulation is presumptively more valid than a
similar regulation would be if it restricted core speech. The
distinction, of course, requires that a dividing line be defined between
what is "commercial" speech and what is not.
In its first decision providing explicit protection to commercial
speech, Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
served as well by a more limited restriction on commercial speech, the excessive
restrictions cannot survive.
65. Id. at 563-64:
[T]here can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial
messages that do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity. The
government may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the public
than to inform it, or commercial speech related to illegal activity. If the
[commercial] communication is neither misleading nor related to unlawful
activity, the government's power is more circumscribed.
(citations omitted).
66. The Court summarized the differential level of protection for commercial speech and
some of the justifications for the difference in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island:
Our opinion [in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976)] noted that the greater "objectivity" of
commercial speech justifies affording the [government] more freedom to
distinguish false commercial advertisements from true ones, and that the greater
"hardiness" of commercial speech, inspired as it is by the profit motive, likely
diminishes the chilling effect that may attend its regulation.
Subsequent cases explained that the [government's] power to regulate
commercial transactions justifies its concomitant power to regulate commercial
speech that is "linked inextricably" to those transactions... Nevertheless, as we
explained in [Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 96
(1977)], the State retains less regulatory authority when its commercial speech
restrictions strike at "the substance of the information communicated" rather than
the "commercial aspect of [it] - with offerors communicating offers to offerees."
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 499 (1996) (plurality opinion) (citations
omitted).
46 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
Consumer Council, Inc.,67 the Court began to explore what was and
was not commercial speech. In the course of explaining why the
speech at issue, pharmacists' advertising of prescription drug prices,
warranted First Amendment protection, the Court recounted
numerous characteristics that did not rob speech of full protection as
core speech: (1) the spending of money to project the speech, as with
a paid advertisement of one sort or the other (for which the Court
cited to political advertising and paid placement of protest-type
notices); (2) placing the speech in a form that is sold for profit (as
with books or movies or religious literature); and (3) including with
the speech a solicitation to pay or contribute money (supported by the
Court with reference to decisions related to religious solicitation and
other advocacy group fund-raising efforts).68 In addition, the Court
rejected the idea that the commercial content of speech (for example,
discussing the regulation of prices by the government or commenting
upon the stock market) causes speech to relinquish full Constitutional
protection.
69
According to the Court, the question before it was "whether
speech which does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction'
is so removed from any 'exposition of ideas' and from 'truth, science,
morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on
the administration of Government' that it lacks all protection., 70 The
Court answered that question in the negative: even "speech which
does no more than propose a commercial transaction" contributes to
enlightened public decisionmaking and is thus protected.71 The Court
did not provide any further exposition of the distinction between
commercial speech and core speech other than to assert that there are
"commonsense differences" between the two.72 As such, Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy provided only an initial definition of
commercial speech as "speech which does no more than propose a
commercial transaction." 73 The later case of Bolger v. Youngs Drug
67. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976).
68. Id. at 761.
69. Id. at 761-62.
70. Id. at 762 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations,
413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973), Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942), and Roth
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
71. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S.at 762-65.
72. Id. at 771 n.24.
73. Id. at 762. The impact of the distinction upon the degree of protection for speech did
not receive significant attention in the decision. The Court only provided that while commercial
speech was not excluded from First Amendment protection, greater regulation of commercial
[Vol. 24
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Products Corp.74 reinforced the differential protection of core and
commercial speech and also somewhat broadened the definition of
commercial speech.75 Under Bolger, even when speech does more
than propose a commercial transaction, a combination of elements can
identify that speech as commercial, rather than core, speech:
presentation in an advertising form, reference to a specific product,
and a speaker's economic motivation. 76 Absent these characteristics,
speech related to commerce will be treated as core speech.
Although the Court is in fact approaching a point where non-
misleading commercial speech is provided protection roughly
equivalent to the protection provided to core speech,77 it has not
reached that point and does not appear likely to do so in the near
future. The line-drawing between commercial and noncommercial
speech remains important. The Court has clearly indicated that core
speech should retain full First Amendment protection - and that few
lines may be drawn within core speech. As such, it would seem
crucial that the line between commercial speech and core speech be
drawn so that we do not mistakenly under-protect core speech by
erroneously identifying it as commercial speech.7 8
speech would be tolerated (as compared to core speech regulation) so that "the flow of truthful
and legitimate commercial information is unimpaired." Id. at 771 n.24.
74. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
75. In Bolger, the defendant had distributed pamphlets discussing venereal diseases.
Some of the pamphlets discussed venereal disease and condom use at length and included the
defendant's name and identified its condom brand only at the bottom of the last page of the
eight-page pamphlet. Id. at 62 n.4. These pamphlets could not be characterized merely as
proposals to engage in commercial transactions, but the Court still classified them as
commercial speech. Id. at 66-68. They were so classified because they (a) were conceded to be
advertisements disseminated in return for payment of money, (b) referenced a specific product,
and (c) were mailed with an economic motive. Id. at 66-67. According to the Court, although
one of those characteristics alone would not support a determination that the pamphlets were
commercial speech, the combination of all of those characteristics supported the classification.
Id. at 67.
76. Id.
77. Accord Volokh, supra note 6, at 738.
78. Cf Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech, 76 VA. L.
REV. 627 (1990). Kozinski and Banner criticize the commercial speech doctrine, including the
vague and malleable definition of commercial speech, noting:
[T]he commercial speech doctrine, like all other shortcuts in the law, is not cost
free. It gives government a powerful weapon to suppress or control speech by
classifying it as merely commercial. If you think carefully enough, you can find a
commercial aspect to almost any first amendment case. Today's protected
expression may become tomorrow's commercial speech.
Id. at 653.
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C. The Intersection of Copyright and the First Amendment
1. Copyright's Abridgment of the Freedom of Speech
The First Amendment provides, in relevant part: "Congress shall
make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. 79
Copyright law abridges an absolute freedom of speech because it
limits an individual's ability to use pre-existing expression.8" As a
result, it also limits somewhat an individual's ability to convey
information to others. Copyright abridges speech by providing the
copyright owner a right of action against another's use of expression
when that expression is substantially similar to the expression
contained within a work in which that owner holds exclusive rights.
By purposely controlling the use of certain expression, copyright law
creates a restriction on the freedom of speech. 81
That copyright law restricts speech, and that the First
Amendment generally prohibits such laws, does not mean copyright
and the First Amendment cannot coexist. As set forth above, the First
Amendment has not been interpreted by the Court to prohibit all
restrictions on speech. Some restrictions survive judicial scrutiny via
a balancing of interests, and copyright itself is supported by valid
public and private interests. Thus we may safely conclude that some
amount of speech restriction via copyright may well be tolerable
under the First Amendment. Nevertheless, not all restriction of speech
via copyright must be tolerated.
Given that U.S. copyright law provides for a private civil right of
action on the part of a copyright owner, rather than direct
governmental regulation, 82 one might question whether Congress,
through copyright, has actually abridged any freedom. This question
should not detain one long. The First Amendment not only restricts
direct governmental interference and regulation by Congress - such
as would arise with an explicit restriction on speech taking place on
79. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
80. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 106 (2000).
81. Accord Stephen M. McJohn, Eldred's Aftermath: Tradition, the Copyright Clause,
and the Constitutionalization of Fair Use, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 95, 100
(2003) ("Copyright, by its nature, restricts expression."). Cf N.Y. Times Co. v. United States,
403 U.S. 713, 726 n. * (1971) (Brennan, J. concurring) (implying, purely in dictum, that because
copyright restrains only expression, leaving ideas free for use, it does not generally create a
restriction on speech).
82. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 501 (2000). The Copyright Act also includes criminal
provisions, but in finding a conflict between copyright and the First Amendment I do not look
only to the possibility of criminal sanction.
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federal property - but it also concerns, and can restrict, the
availability under state or federal law of civil actions by private
individuals. 83 For example, the private nature of a copyright
infringement claim may be compared to a private claim of
defamation, such as the claim made almost fifty years ago by one Mr.
Sullivan regarding the allegedly libelous nature of a paid
advertisement in the New York Times.84 The state's provision of a
civil action against the Times and certain persons associated with
placement of the advertisement, and the actual use of the action by
Sullivan in a manner alleged to restrain the First Amendment rights of
the defendants, was sufficient, according to the Supreme Court, to
bring the state law within the realm subject to First Amendment
scrutiny. 85 Like state defamation laws, copyright laws are speech
restrictions enforced through private rights of action. As such, I find
no difficulty whatsoever in asserting that copyright laws must pass
First Amendment scrutiny even though copyright provides for private
rights of action rather than direct governmental intervention and
control.
2. Analyzing the Competing Constitutional Interests of
Copyright and Speech
Both copyright protection and the freedom of speech arise from
the U.S. Constitution, one from an express power granted to Congress
in the Copyright Clause and the other from the First Amendment. The
relationship of federal copyright to the guarantee of freedom of
speech demonstrates that the two are potentially, although not
necessarily always, at odds. I maintain, as others have before me, that
despite the fact that the Constitution expressly provides Congress
with the power to enact copyright laws and only generally prohibits
Congressional interference with the freedom of speech, the First
83. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964):
Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the Alabama courts have
applied a state rule of law which petitioners claim to impose invalid restrictions
on their constitutional freedoms of speech and press. It matters not that that law
has been applied in a civil action and that it is common law only, though
supplemented by statute. The test is not the form in which state power has been
applied but, whatever the form, whether such power has in fact been exercised.
(citations omitted). See also Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that use of the
judicial system to enforce a private agreement is state action implicating Constitutional rights).
84. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 265.
85. Id.
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Amendment can and does restrict the manner and means available to
Congress to effectuate its copyright power. 86
Not all laws enacted under one of Congress's enumerated
powers overlap with or even implicate the First Amendment
protection of speech, but some of those laws do. For example, were
Congress to pass, under its expressly enumerated power to "regulate
Commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes, 87 a prohibition on the interstate shipment of
flammable liquids without a permit issued by a federal authority, we
would find no conflict with the First Amendment.88 But were the
hypothetical law one that prohibits the interstate shipment of Arabic-
language texts without a permit issued by a Federal authority, the
analysis would change. Again, the law falls within the enumerated
commerce power. And yet any contemporary legal mind would balk
at the validity of such a law when considering it under the First
Amendment. This abridgment of the freedom of speech (not to
mention of the press) would not be vindicated by any court, even
following an analysis of any governmental interest proffered in
support, however compelling that interest might seem. The
prohibition would simply be too broad and too restrictive of protected
speech to be found sufficiently narrowly tailored to pass First
Amendment muster.
Both hypothetical laws would survive review if express powers
necessarily trumped general limitations. That cannot be the case. The
First Amendment removes from Congress certain powers that
otherwise would be fully within the Commerce Clause power.
89
86. See, e.g., Van Alstyne, supra note 6; 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 504-05 (Leonard W. Levy et al. eds., 1986) (containing Melville Nimmer's entry
on copyright, wherein Nimmer explains that the First Amendment specifically limits those
powers entrusted to the federal government, including copyright, for "[i]f it did not modify such
powers, it would have no meaning at all.").
87. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (the Commerce Clause).
88. This law operates within the Commerce Clause sphere and yet does not affect or even
implicate the freedom of speech that Congress may not abridge. The law does not restrict in any
manner the ways in which flammable liquids may be utilized by persons, including their
utilization in setting fire to a United States flag as part of one's exercise of a right to free
expression. As such, no true conflict exists between this particular law, validly enacted under the
enumerated interstate commerce power, and the prohibition contained within the First
Amendment.
89. See Van Alstyne, supra note 6, at 228-29.
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Commerce-based laws may be found invalid if they attempt to
exercise powers removed by the First Amendment.
90
The Copyright Clause does not differ from the Commerce
Clause in this respect: just as the existence of the Commerce Clause
as an express power does not allow it to evade First Amendment
scrutiny, neither can the Copyright Clause so evade the First
Amendment. The historical sequence of events provides some
evidence that the First Amendment was intended to limit otherwise
possible exercises of Congressional powers contained within the
Constitution as originally ratified.91 In addition, scholars now hold a
fairly uniform view of the interplay of the Bill of Rights with the
Constitution, allowing for critical judicial review of otherwise valid
enactments under enumerated Congressional powers.92 As such, the
90. The remaining question is whether the Constitutionally protected freedom of speech
(or of the press) includes the freedom to ship Arabic-language books across state lines such that
the First Amendment would invalidate the hypothetical law. See id.
91. On the other hand, the first federal copyright law and the Bill of Rights were both
enacted in 1790, which might mean that the Founders saw no conflict at all between the two. See
Craig Joyce & L. Ray Patterson, Copyright in 1791: An Essay Concerning the Founders' View
of the Copyright Power Granted to Congress in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S.
Constitution, 52 EMORY L. J. 909, 943-44 (2003). Joyce and Patterson argue that there is no
conflict between copyright and the First Amendment, and that the historical sequence supports
this view, but they also argue that the potential for conflict disappears only when, like the first
U.S. copyright statute, the copyright term is limited to a short period of time and publication is
required for the existence of rights. Id. at 943-45. But because no discussion by the Founders of
copyright's particular relationship to free speech has been found, the Founders' view of a
specific interplay between the two cannot be concretely supported in either way. See id. at 946-
49; Tyler T. Ochoa & Mark Rose, The Anti-Monopoly Origins of the Patent and Copyright
Clause, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 909, 919-28 (2002) (discussing in detail the
sources available regarding the adoption of the Copyright Clause, citing James Madison's Notes
of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, which reflects that no debate occurred with
respect to the adoption of the Copyright Clause, and noting that the Clause was rarely mentioned
in subsequent ratification debates). At least one participant in the ratification debates is quoted
as believing the Copyright Clause to be compatible with the First Amendment freedom of the
press, see id. at 924-25 (quoting future Justice James Iredell of North Carolina on the subject),
but little else exists in the record on the topic. And despite the possibility that the Founders
considered the issue and saw no conflict between early copyright law and the First Amendment,
the general argument as to the import of the historical sequence still remains. The fact that a
sufficient number of early lawmakers determined a Bill of Rights to be necessary and advisable
must indicate that it controls, and was intended to control, Congress's enumerated powers.
92. For example, Neil Netanel notes that the Supreme Court has applied the First
Amendment on more than one occasion to restrain otherwise valid enumerated Article I powers,
such as the power to operate a post office, the power to punish counterfeiting of U.S. currency,
and the Federal District Clause power. See Netanel, supra note 6, at 38 n.154. Netanel argues
simply and convincingly that because the First Amendment has been held to restrain other
enumerated powers, and because there is nothing in the Copyright Clause to suggest that it is
any different, there is no justification for an argument that copyright is somehow immune from a
free speech restraint by virtue of its Constitutional basis.
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Copyright Clause does not pose a limitation on the full extent of what
the guaranteed freedoms of speech and press are in the first instance.
Instead, even when Congress stays within the power granted by the
Copyright Clause when it enacts a law, the First Amendment provides
an additional constraint on the freedom of Congress to act.
93
3. Other Arguments for First Amendment Control
A rather facile attempt to foreclose First Amendment control of
copyright might (and has) reasoned that as "property" granted by law,
a copyright need not yield to the First Amendment.9 4 The admittedly
93. Van Alstyne argues that the Constitution includes the copyright power for much the
same reason that it includes the commerce power, namely, to "provide a pre-emptive uniformity
of law, in respect to the subject embraced by the clause," due to the "manifest undesirability of
perpetuating [the] uncheckable pluralism" within the patent and copyright fields that would be
created by a "patchwork of statute books, and common law, of each particular state." Van
Alstyne, supra note 6, at 234-35. Van Alstyne's position is, then, that the Copyright Clause was
intended only to replace, and did simply replace, a power that would otherwise be held by the
states. As such, he takes the position that "just as the Commerce Clause provision 'answers'
Federalism questions but not First Amendment questions, the same is exactly true in respect to
the Copyright Clause as well." Id. at 236. He concludes by stating that the Copyright Clause
"preempts" nothing within the protection of the First Amendment, [and] any
feature of any portion of any act Congress has, or may in the future, provide
under sanction of this clause, may always be brought into question respecting
whether, on its face or as applied, it offends against the larger freedom of speech
and of the press provided constitutional sanctuary in the First Amendment still
unfolding in the United States.
Id. at 238. Van Alstyne cites Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Ic. and Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Moral Majority, Inc. as two cases in which the Supreme Court interpreted the fair use provision
of section 107 to allow the uses, thus avoiding what would have otherwise been a head-on
collision of the First Amendment with a claim of copyright infringement. Id. at 238 n.34.
94. This property vs. speech argument proceeds under more than one line of argument.
The first is that the First Amendment does not require the private owner of real property to allow
the use of that property as a forum for free speech and therefore that the private owner of
intangible property, namely copyright-protected expression, is similarly not required to allow
the use of that expression in the exercise of free speech. The second is that fencing off (as it
were) certain language or symbols, even if a speech restriction, is easily defensible as a valid
time, place or manner restriction on free speech - which incorporates the argument that a
speaker does not have the right to "make other people's speeches" when exercising the
speaker's First Amendment rights. As to the second argument - the one that brings up "other
people's speeches" - misses two issues: first, recall that neither "place" nor "manner" in time,
place, and manner restrictions refers to the content of speech, instead implicating physical
location or a characteristic such as volume; and second, it ignores the definitive First
Amendment principle acknowledging that certain expression has a communicative, speech-
related power that simply cannot always be equaled by use of synonymous or substitute
expression. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) ("[W]ords are often chosen as much
for their emotive as their cognitive force .... [ln the same vein, we cannot indulge the facile
assumption that one can forbid particular words without also running a substantial risk of
suppressing ideas in the process."). In this regard one may be reminded of Judge Kozinski's
rather apt observation that an argument denying a speaker the right to use particular, chosen
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facile response to this argument is that while real property does
indeed share certain characteristics with intangible property, including
the basic principle of the right to exclude, the two forms of "property"
are not similar in all respects, particularly with respect to the interplay
with the First Amendment. Real property, with respect to speech, is
only a forum for speech, while the language or expression within the
copyright "property" right is the speech. 95 The two forms of property
quite simply cannot be lumped together when exploring the
interaction with the First Amendment. In addition, no property right is
so absolute as to rebuff all unwanted uses, particularly uses in the
public interest.96
In his comprehensive article on the interplay of copyright with
the First Amendment, Neil Netanel reviews a number of justifications
that are proffered for setting copyright aside, out of the purview of the
First Amendment, and he finds them all lacking.97 In particular, he
argues that the "internal safeguards" claim presented by the Court in
Eldred simply cannot hold up over time.98 Internal safety valves may
need to be shored up now and then or supplemented, and the alleged
past harmony of copyright and free speech cannot be continually used
to deny free speech challenges to elements of the copyright laws.99 He
notes that at the time of New York Times v. Sullivan, libel had its own
internal free speech safeguards, such as the traditionally recognized
privileges for bookstores and libraries that sold defamatory material
originally published by others.100 Those safeguards did not dissuade
the Court from exploring libel's infringement of free speech in
language through mere invocation of the protection of an intellectual property right "no more
answers the first amendment concerns here than to suggest that Paul Robert Cohen could have
worn a jacket saying 'I Strongly Resent the Draft."' Int'l Olympic Comm. v. San Francisco Arts
& Athletics, 789 F.2d 1319, 1321 (9th Cir. 1986) (Kozinski, J., dissenting). See also San
Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Judge Kozinski's observation in his dissent in the decision
below).
95. See also Netanel, supra note 6, at 39 (acknowledging that real property rights are
somewhat immune to a free speech restraint but arguing that a real property right poses an
incidental burden on expressive freedom while a copyright creates a direct burden on expressive
freedom since the right is specifically directed to information and communication).
96. And whether copyright is viewed as a property right or economic regulation, it is
expressly not absolute - as shown by the requirement that an otherwise infringing use not be a
fair use before copyright liability may be imposed, see 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 107 (2000), in addition
to a number of other specific statutory exceptions and exemptions, see 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 108-
121 (2000).
97. See Netanel, supra note 6, at 37-47.
98. Id. at 40-42.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 41.
54 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
connection with commentary on public officials, and it determined
that additional, non-traditional protection was required.'O
Eugene Volokh, on the other hand, does not generally dispute the
copyright "exception," by which copyright's constitutional basis
differentiates it from other speech restrictions. °2 Yet even he argues
for First Amendment restraint. 0 3 In particular, he argues against
certain justifications for lack of First Amendment restraints, such as
the claim that copyright-infringing speech is less valuable than other
speech because it is unoriginal.10 4 This was claimed by the Court in
Eldred when it stated "[t]he First Amendment securely protects the
freedom to make--or decline to make-one's own speech; it bears
less heavily when speakers assert the right to make other people's
speeches."' 5 Volokh finds similarly unpersuasive the justification of
a copyright owner's right to refrain from speaking, as discussed in
Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises.106 Not only does Volokh point
to the value to listeners of copied speech as a means of information
dissemination and the value that repeating speech may have within
the realm of self-realization or self-expression, but he also analyzes
and debunks the comparison of copyright infringement to compelled
speech.0 7 Both Volokh and Netanel persuasively argue against
various means that have been asserted to remove copyright from First
Amendment scrutiny.
D. Copyright's Speech Benefits
Although copyright may, in fact, encourage the production and
dissemination of speech, that speech-enhancing quality does not
eliminate or sideline the ability of the First Amendment to shape and
control copyright. The Supreme Court has urged that copyright serves
a free speech purpose by encouraging the production and
dissemination of speech that may then remain under the limited
control of the speaker or author rather than the government. 0 8 Some
arguments go further, holding that any theoretical restriction on the
First Amendment-protected "freedom of speech" by copyright must
101. Id.
102. See Volokh, supra note 6, at 713-14, 725.
103. Id. at 714-32.
104. Id. at 725-27.
105. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 187, 221 (2003).
106. See Volokh, supra note 6, at 727-32. See also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559-60 (1985).
107. See Volokh, supra note 6, at 725-32.
108. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558.
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be countenanced in light of copyright's pursuit of this speech-
enhancing, lofty constitutional goal, namely, the encouragement of
authorial production for the promotion of scientific and artistic
progress. 0 9 The Court has not rejected this line of thought: "The
Copyright Clause and First Amendment were adopted close in time.
This proximity indicates that, in the Framers' view, copyright's
limited monopolies are compatible with free speech principles. Indeed
copyright's purpose is to promote the creation and publication of free
expression.""l0 The Court did, on the other hand, reject the idea that
copyright is thereby "categorically immune" from First Amendment
scrutiny.' 1
The implication, if not the outright assertion, of the Court in
emphasizing copyright's free speech benefits is that copyright is
functionally, although not theoretically, immune to First Amendment
regulation in light of its First Amendment enhancing characteristics
and the vague limitations provided within fair use and the idea-
expression distinction.'12 In my view, however, the speech-enhancing
characteristics of copyright's utilitarian purpose and structure do not
grant categorical immunity to any and every statutory copyright
scheme chosen by Congress."13 To use a hypothetical situation for a
point of comparison: the speech-enhancing characteristics and
purpose of a free, government-sponsored forum, such as a local-
access radio station, would not bar a First-Amendment challenge if
the regulations apportioning use of the forum between applicants
resulted in suppression of speech from certain groups, even if that
forum provided limited rights of reply. Even if the goal and primary
function of copyright, like the hypothetical forum, were to encourage
109. See, e.g., McGowan, supra note 6, at 332-38.
110. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219.
Ill. Id. at 221.
112. See, e.g., id. ("[W]hen, as in this case, Congress has not altered the traditional
contours of copyright protection, further First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary."). See also
McGowan, supra note 6 (arguing that while there may be a relationship between copyright and
the First Amendment, the First Amendment can provide no real means for judicial control over
Congressional copyright enactments); Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Copyright Under Siege: The
First Amendment Front, 9 COMP. L. REV. & TECH. J. 41, 61 (2004) (arguing that copyright's
enhancement of speech, in conjunction with the idea-expression dichotomy and fair use, avoids
"any real, intrinsic tension" between copyright and the First Amendment).
113. See Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (invalidating a state
right-of-reply statute although it was intended, at least in part, to increase the information
available to the public); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (striking federal limits on election
expenditures despite the fact that those limits were designed to provide a more equal political
playing field for less wealthy individuals and groups).
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the creation of additional speech, the goal and function provide no
ultimate First Amendment protection.'
14
Because the First Amendment can guide and shape copyright,
copyright law must provide adequate breathing room for the exercise
of the freedom of speech. The Court has thus far only applied
rational-basis scrutiny, rather than a stricter First Amendment level of
scrutiny, to federal copyright law and its connection to the Copyright
Clause. 1 5 Nevertheless, the fact that copyright clearly restricts speech
mandates either that copyright law be structured to allow some outlets
for the exercise of free speech by use of copyright-protected
expression, when appropriate, or that the courts be willing and able to
perform separate First Amendment review in copyright cases. The
specific level of scrutiny to be applied to copyright is not my concern
here. 116 For the purposes of this article, it is sufficient to argue that
114. Accord Netanel, supra note 6, at 42. As to copyright's asserted free speech benefits,
Netanel makes the point that there are other laws advocated as beneficial to free speech in the
form of dissemination of a variety of expression, such as the must-carry rules for cable
television or some campaign finance restrictions, and yet these laws are not immune to scrutiny.
In addition, he argues that copyright's expansion over the years may mean that the free speech
benefits are shrinking in comparison to the expanded restrictions.
115. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 204-08.
116. Commentators debate the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to copyright and
whether copyright is a content-based or content-neutral restriction on speech. For purposes of
this article, it is sufficient to argue that copyright is indeed subject to First Amendment scrutiny
of some sort, rather than being somehow theoretically or functionally immune to a free speech
challenge, including limited immunity by virtue of the presence of internal safeguards alleged to
protect the freedom of expression. I believe this to be so because my conclusion is that under
any level of scrutiny used for a speech-regulating law (which copyright is), the restraint is not
currently tailored in any way to the interest being promoted. In this way, my position may echo
that of Justice Breyer in his dissent in Eldred:
I would review plausible claims that a copyright statute seriously, and
unjustifiably, restricts the dissemination of speech somewhat more carefully than
reference to this Court's traditional Commerce Clause jurisprudence might
suggest. There is no need in this case to characterize that review as a search for
"congruence and proportionality," or as some other variation of what this Court
has called "intermediate scrutiny." Rather, it is necessary only to recognize that
this statute involves not pure economic regulation, but regulation of expression,
and what may count as rational where economic regulation is at issue is not
necessarily rational where we focus on expression-in a Nation constitutionally
dedicated to the free dissemination of speech, information, learning, and culture.
In this sense only, and where line-drawing among constitutional interests is at
issue, I would look harder than does the majority at the statute's rationality-
though less hard than precedent might justify.
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 244 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Neil Netanel has focused upon the location of copyright within the First Amendment
categorical "skein" (as he calls it), arguing that it is a content-neutral speech regulation, as
opposed to a content-based speech regulation, a conduct regulation, or some other category of
governmental regulation. The ultimate thrust of Netanel's article is that as a content-neutral
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copyright is subject to First Amendment scrutiny of some sort, rather
than being somehow immune to a free speech challenge altogether, or
immune by virtue of the presence of internal safeguards alleged to
protect the freedom of expression.
Having demonstrated that the First Amendment can and should,
in appropriate instances, limit the manner and means available for
implementation of the Copyright Clause, the next issue becomes
whether there are indicia of that restraint present in current copyright
law and jurisprudence. As noted above, the Court relies upon the
distinction between ideas and expression and upon the fair use
defense," 7 and here I focus on the role of the fair use defense as a
safeguard for protected speech. I argue that the Court errs in asserting
that fair use is a primary locus within copyright for harmonization
with the guarantee of freedom of speech. Fair use does not contain
any real First Amendment restraints.
III. ABSENCE OF A FIRST AMENDMENT PURPOSE IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF FAIR USE
A. Early History of Fair Use
Our fair use defense originated from the "fair abridgment"
doctrine developed by English courts in the eighteenth century. The
early English cases created a limit on the copyright owner's rights:
those rights included the right to prevent a "mere evasion" of
copyright by only "colourably shorten[ing]" a work but did not
include the right to "restrain persons from making a real and fair
abridgment, for abridgments may with great propriety be called a new
book, because not only the paper and print, but the intention, learning
and judgment of the author is shewn in them."'" 8 Fair abridgment
speech regulation, copyright is deserving of heightened intermediate scrutiny as a governmental
allocation of a speech entitlement under the rationale of Turner Broad Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 512
U.S. 622, 661-62 (1994). See Netanel, supra note 6, at 47-69.
Eugene Volokh disagrees, finding copyright to be content-based speech regulation.
See Volokh, supra note 6, at 703-11. Despite that finding, with its attendant heightened scrutiny,
Volokh does not find copyright to be per se invalid. Instead he argues that it is in fact largely
valid despite its categorization as a content-based restriction. He compares it to obscenity and
libel laws in that those laws are also content-based and are yet largely valid due to the
compelling governmental interests being promoted, which in the case of copyright would be the
economic reward to authors that our system uses to promote creation and publication of new
works. See id. at 713.
117. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
118. Gyles v. Wilcox, (1740) 2 Atk. 141, 143 (No. 130); see also Tonson v. Walker,
(1752) 3 Swans. 671, 677 (App.). William Patry provides a comprehensive overview of the
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eventually developed into the fair use doctrine, both in England and in
the United States. 1 9 This early fair use doctrine protected a defendant
from liability for copying another's work for the purpose of creating
abridgments, reviews, or criticisms. 120 In his monograph on the
privilege of fair use, William Patry points to Gray v. Russell121 as the
first American case discussing the concerns that would later be
molded into the American version of the fair use doctrine. 122 In
dictum in that case, Justice Story, sitting on circuit, presented certain
issues worthy of consideration when evaluating a defense that a work
was a noninfringing review or abridgment: the purpose of the use,
1 23
the effect upon the author's legitimate interests, 124 and the quantity
and quality of the portions used.
1 25
early English cases, including Gyles and Tonson, in his monograph on the fair use defense. See
WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 6-18 (2d ed. 1995).
119. And during further development of fair use, although the need for limitations on the
otherwise absolute nature of copyright remained appealing to the judiciary and the legislature,
the idea that an abridgment of a work rightfully fell within the scope of the limitations rather
than the scope of the copyright did not. Over time, abridgments were found to be infringements
rather than fair uses. See 17 U.S.C. § 1(b) (1909) (repealed 1978); see also Story v. Holcombe,
23 F. Cas. 171, 172 (C.C.D. Ohio 1847) (No. 13,497); Copyright Act of 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c.
46, § 2(1)(i) (Eng.) (bringing fair use within British statutory copyright law but eliminating
abridgments from the codified doctrine, by excluding from infringement "[a]ny fair dealing with
any work for the purposes of private study, research, criticism, review, or newspaper
summary").
120. See generally PATRY, supra note 118, at 6-63.
121. Gray v. Russell, 10 F. Cas. 1035 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 5,728).
122. See PATRY, supra note 118, at 19.
123. Gray, 10 F. Cas. at 1038:
[I]f large extracts are made [from a work] in a review, it might be a question,
whether those extracts were designed bona fide for the mere purpose of criticism,
or were designed to supersede the original work under the pretence of a review,
by giving its substance in a fugitive form. The same difficulty may arise in
relation to an abridgement of an original work. The question, in such a case, must
be compounded of various considerations [including] whether it be a bona fide
abridgment, or only an evasion by the omission of some unimportant parts.
124. Id. ("The question [in an abridgment] must be compounded of various considerations
[including] whether it will, in its present form, prejudice or supersede the original work; whether
it will be adapted to the same class of readers; and many other considerations of the same
sort.").
125. Id. at 1038-39:
In many cases, the question may naturally turn upon the point, not so much of the
quantity, as of the value of the selected materials.... The quintessence of a work
may be piratically extracted, so as to leave a mere caput mortuum, by a selection
of all the important passages in a comparatively moderate space.
On this point, Justice Story quoted the English case ofBramwell v. Halcomb, 3 Mylne & Craig
737, 738 (Ch. 1836), wherein The Lord Chancellor Cottenham stated:
When it comes to a question of quantity, it must be very vague. One writer might
take all the vital part of another's book, though it might be but a small proportion
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Two years later, Justice Story, again sitting on circuit, issued
another opinion concerning some of the same defensive issues from
Gray v. Russell in the case of Folsom v. Marsh.12 6 In Folsom,
plaintiffs work consisted of eleven volumes containing letters written
by President George Washington 127 plus one volume containing a
biography of the President's life, for a total of almost seven thousand
pages. The defendant's work consisted of two volumes in which the
life of Washington was told through the use of certain of the
President's letters, with narrative interspersed between to connect and
explain the story. The defendant copied at least two hundred fifty-five
pages of Washington's private letters from the plaintiffs work.1
28
The plaintiff claimed that the defendant's use of Washington's
letters constituted copyright infringement, while the defendant
countered that his work was noninfringing although it used material
from plaintiffs work. The defendant contended that his work
constituted a new and original work because it used only selected
portions of the plaintiffs twelve-volume work. 129 As characterized by
Justice Story, while the defendant's work may have been a new work
that "cannot properly be treated as an abridgment of that of the
plaintiffs [or] strictly and wholly a mere compilation from the latter,"
the work did consist of some copying, as it did "not profess to give
fugitive extracts, or brilliant passages from particular letters [and was]
a selection of the entire contents of particular letters, from the whole
collection or mass of letters of the work of the plaintiffs."' 30 In
addition, Story noted that "[firom the known taste and ability of
[defendant], it cannot be doubted, that these letters are the most
instructive, useful and interesting to be found in that large
collection."
'1 31
Story recognized that an author writing for the purpose of "fair
and reasonable criticism" could "fairly cite largely from the original
of the book in quantity. It is not only quantity, but value that is always looked to.
It is useless to look to any particular cases as to quantity.
Gray, 10 F. Cas. at 1039.
126. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).
127. Plaintiffs copyright in the letters arose by bequest of the letters from Washington to
his nephew, from whom the plaintiff acquired rights before publishing the letters for the first
time. Under then-current law, the copyright term was measured from publication. Id. at 345.
128. Id.
129. Defendant also raised other objections to the infringement claim, including an
argument that Washington's letters were not protected by copyright, although those objections
were unsuccessful. See id. at 345-47.
130. Id. at 347-48.
131. Id. at 348.
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work" and that a "fair and bona fide abridgment of an original work
[was] not a piracy of the copyright."'' 32 On the other hand, he noted
that infringement would exist in a case where "the whole substance of
one work has been copied from another, with slight omissions and
formal differences only."' 33 The question presented in Folsom was
whether the defendant's use of plaintiff's work was justifiable and
thus noninfringing. 1
34
Justice Story characterized cases of this nature, where a
defendant's admitted use of a prior work may yet be noninfringing, as
being of a sort "in which it is not, from the peculiar nature and
character of the controversy, easy to arrive at any satisfactory
conclusion, or to lay down any general principles applicable to all
cases." '135 Many later cases have quoted Justice Story's particular
language from Folsom:
[W]e must often, in deciding questions of this sort, look to the
nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of
the materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice
the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the
original work. 1
36
Importantly, Story did not apply each of these factors
individually to the facts of the case before him. Instead, Story focused
upon the value of the copyrighted work and, through that lens,
determined that the copyright had been infringed:
[I]f the defendants may take three hundred and nineteen letters,...
there is no reason why another bookseller may not take other five
hundred letters, and a third, one thousand letters, and so on, and
thereby the plaintiff's copyright be totally destroyed. Besides;
every one must see, that the work of the defendants is mainly
founded up on these letters, constituting more than one third of
their work, and imparting to it its greatest, nay, its essential value.
Without those letters, in its present form the work must fall to the
132. Id. at 344.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 348.
135. Id. at 344. As put by Patry, "Looked at out of [the context of the facts and Story's full
opinion], the passage is of little practical value. Are these factors of equal weight? What about
conflicts between the factors? Do we begin the inquiry by examining a specific factor? Under
what circumstances are we to examine the factors at all?" PATRY, supra note 118, at 21.
136. Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 348. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S.
569, 576 (1994) (quoting the above passage from Folsom); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 475 n.27 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (same). Justice Story's
language even found its way back into English case law. See Scott v. Stanford, (1867) L.R. 3
Eq. 718, 722.
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ground. It is not a case, where abbreviated or select passages are
taken from particular letters; but the entire letters are taken, and
those of most interest and value to the public, as illustrating the
life, the acts, and the character of Washington. 1
37
Other scholars have noted how important the factors in Folsom
became, and still are, to our statutory law and jurisprudence.' 38 Justice
Story did not treat his factors in Folsom as a comprehensive checklist
to be mechanically applied in all fair use cases, nor did he intend for
them to serve as such. The opinion shows that these factors are non-
exclusive, malleable, and adjustable considerations, relevant in some
cases but not in others. Justice Story simply characterized the then-
current state of the law as he understood it, and proceeded to resolve
the case presented. He expressly regretted that he did not feel free to
take other important issues into account, such as the merit and effort
demonstrated by the defendant's new work. 3 9
Justice Story's opinion in Folsom does not mention the First
Amendment or free speech rights. Not surprisingly, none of the fair
use decisions written by Story or his contemporaries discuss "free
speech." This lack of attention to issues regarding the freedom of
speech is not surprising, since at the time Story and his
contemporaries wrote, the First Amendment possessed little of the
prohibitory firepower it holds today. 40 But in light of the First
Amendment's current power and vitality within modem society and
jurisprudence, if fair use is to be used to protect speech interests, I
maintain that it would be improper to apply an analysis from 1841
without taking into account the vast changes in the First Amendment
landscape.
B. From Folsom to the 1960s
The case law and scholarship between Folsom and the enactment
of the 1976 Copyright Act show that the fair use doctrine broadened
from abridgment and review to include other forms of criticism,
parody, and quotation.141 This broadening is the primary feature of the
137. Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 349.
138. See, e.g., PATRY, supra note 118, at 24; Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use
Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1105 (1990). See also Campbell, 510 U.S. at 576; Sony
Corp., 464 U.S. at 475 n.27.
139. See Folsom, 9 F.Cas. at 349.
140. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn
Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1965).
141. During this period, abridgments were removed from the scope of the fair use doctrine.
See supra note 119.
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development of fair use during this long period of time. An 1870
treatise characterized the general availability of the fair use defense to
a claim made by a commercial competitor: "It is a recognized
principle that every author, compiler, or publisher may make certain
uses of a copyrighted work, in the preparation of a rival or other
publication."'' 42 During this time period, courts regularly applied the
fair use doctrine in various commercial contexts; it was not restricted
to noncommercial uses. The lack of a regular, meaningful distinction
between commercial and noncommercial use in this period makes the
insertion of the distinction into fair use in the 1976 Copyright Act, as
discussed below at Part III.D, difficult to rationalize.
L. Ray Patterson, who wrote extensively on the historical
development of copyright, argued that in all of the early years of the
fair use doctrine, at least up to the 1909 Copyright Act, courts did not
apply the doctrine to a non-competitive or non-commercial use,
largely because those uses were not within the scope of the copyright
owner's rights.143 As he argued the issue, both the fair-abridgment
history of the doctrine and the general restriction of copyright
infringement to commercial, marketplace uses and not personal,
consumer uses meant that fair use originally aimed to excuse certain
uses despite their being potentially competitive with the original
work. 14 4 Fair use was not limited to situations where the second use
did not compete with the original. 45 Commercial concerns, to the
extent considered, were subsumed within the inquiry into harm to the
market for the plaintiffs work. 146 Through much of the development
of the fair use doctrine, then, courts did not typically make a
distinction between commercial and noncommercial uses when
working through a fair use analysis.
142. EATON S. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL
PRODUCTIONS 386 (1879) (emphasis added).
143. Patterson, supra note 14, at 38-40.
144. Id. Jessica Litman concurs: "prior to the 1976 Act, almost all fair use case law
involved commercial uses." Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative
History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 898 n.256 (1987). Litman made that statement in the course
of criticizing the Supreme Court's express discrimination against commercial uses and its
distinction of those uses from noncommercial uses in Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), and Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539 (1985), calling the discrimination and distinction "the Court's own invention: it relied
on no prior cases to derive them." Id. at 898.
145. Patterson, supra note 14, at 38-40.
146. See id. at 43 (observing that Folsom, the case generally credited with setting the
standard for fair use, included economic effect of a use as a factor but did not include the nature
of the use as a separate factor).
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One notable aberration, where a court did expressly distinguish
between commercial and noncommercial purposes, was Henry Holt &
Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. 147 Henry Holt involved the
defendant's use of three sentences from a scientific book in
defendant's advertising pamphlet regarding its tobacco products.
Defendant, Liggett & Myers, had in its pamphlet entitled "Some facts
about Cigarettes" asked and answered the question "Do cigarettes
affect the throat?" The pamphlet stated:
Dr. Leon Felderman, noted oto-laryngologist, Philadelphia, is
quoted (1931) as follows: "'Statistics have it that 80 per cent of
physicians are smokers * * * It appears unanimous that smoking as
not nearly so injurious as over-eating * * * From my experience
with ear, nose and throat cases, I firmly believe that tobacco, when
properly used, has no ill effect upon the auditory passages."
' 148
Despite the brevity of the material used and its inability to
supersede the purpose of or market for plaintiffs work, the court
ruled the use infringing rather than fair.149 In so doing, it placed a
previously unknown restriction on the fair use defense's ability to
excuse a commercial use. The court viewed fair use as a doctrine
designed only to allow
those working in the field of science or art to make use of ideas,
opinions, or theories, and in certain cases even the exact words
contained in a copyrighted book in that field .... in order "that the
world may not be deprived of improvements, nor the progress of
the arts be retarded." 0
The court thought defendant's use fell outside the fields of science
and art, and it decided that uses having a "purely commercial
purpose," such as the advertising pamphlets in question, were not
worthy of the fair use privilege.'
5 1
More important to the court than the defendant's commercial
purpose was plaintiffs allegation that the use of Dr. Felderman's
work in a cigarette advertisement had "cast reflections upon his
professional ethics and [had] brought down upon him the term
'commercialist,' all of which has contributed to negative and deter the
147. Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1938).
148. Id. at 303.
149. Id. at 304.
150. Id. (quoting language from an English case authored by Lord Mansfield, Sayre v.
Moore, I East. 361).
151. Id.
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sale of his book. 1 52 As such, the court was actually focusing on the
influence of the defendant's use upon the market for plaintiffs work,
rather than the commerciality of the use per se. But at the same time,
the court was also allowing critical or reputational effects to
overcome the proper focus of the market inquiry, specifically whether
defendant's use supersedes the place of plaintiffs work in the market.
The modem Supreme Court has made it clear that a use that subjects
the plaintiffs work to criticism or even ridicule does not create the
harm to be considered in fair use - instead the relevant harm is
restricted to harm via market displacement and similar damage.1
53
In limiting fair use to works advancing knowledge and excluding
uses with a "commercial purpose," the Henry Holt court did not focus
on whether the defendant sold its work for profit. To the contrary, the
court equated commercial purpose with an advertising use by which
defendant sought to profit from a product other than its allegedly
infringing work. The court did not equate commercial purpose with
the defendant's pursuit of profits through sale of the defendant's new
work.
The decision in Henry Holt deviated from then then-traditional
doctrine of fair use. In raising a bar to uses with "a purely commercial
purpose" and favoring only uses within the same "field of art or
science," the court largely restricted fair use to uses competitive with
the original work. The previous trend had been to include all uses,
including commercial uses, within the broad range of uses that were
potentially fair. On the other hand, competitive uses - uses in the
same field or uses that might supersede the original - were the least
likely to be judged fair.154 In light of other considerations within fair
use ignored by the Henry Holt decision, such as whether the second
use could damage the original work by superseding it, this court's
analysis is unusual indeed. The decision did not gain traction, and its
commercial-purpose analysis cannot be said to have persuaded many
later courts. Overall, the general trend of broadening the range of
152. Id. at 303.
153. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591-93 (1994).
154. See Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 61 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8,136). See also
Karll v. Curtis Publ'g Co., 39 F. Supp. 836, 837-38 (E.D. Wis. 1957):
The rule is well stated in 18 C.J.S., Copyright & Literary Property § 94, subd.
C., (3), p. 219: '* * * Nevertheless the cases frequently lay stress on the fact of
competition, or the lack of it, in determining whether the amount of matter copied
is reasonable in amount and character or is an infringement, and it is safe to say
that where the later work differs greatly in nature, scope, and purpose from the
original, a larger liberty in making quotations and abstracts will be permitted than
in cases where the respective works are more or less competitive.
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potentially fair uses, and continuing to include commercial uses
within that range, continued in the courts into the 1960s.1
55
C. Free Speech Interests and Fair Use in the 1960s
Express consideration of free speech concerns did not arise in
copyright decisions until the 1960s, perhaps because the First
Amendment had not been, until then, authoritatively applied to
restrain private civil actions,1 56 nor had it been broadly applied to
prohibit or curtail the imposition of formerly traditional restraints on
speech. 57 When free speech interests were asserted in the copyright
context, the courts shoehorned the public's interest in the
dissemination of expression and ideas into the familiar framework of
fair use, rather than considering speech on its own merits.' 58 Two of
the earliest fair use decisions in which the courts considered the
public interest in dissemination of speech protected by the First
Amendment in connection with their application of the fair use
doctrine are Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc. and
Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates. 59 In those cases, the fair use
and idea-expression doctrines proved capable of being interpreted to
avoid the possible conflict between speech and the copyright claim. In
both cases the courts ruled in favor of fair use, and in so doing
mooted any separate First Amendment claim the defendants could
have raised.
In Rosemont, the Second Circuit applied the doctrine of fair use
to the defendant's unquestionable use in a biography of material from
magazine articles in which plaintiff owned the copyright. 60 The court
ruled the use to be fair and overturned the district court's grant of a
preliminary injunction. The court quoted a copyright treatise in
155. See Berlin v. E.C. Publ'ns, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 543 (2d Cir. 1964) ("While indeed
broad, the area in which a copyright proprietor is permitted the exclusive commercial benefits of
his copyrighted work is clearly not without limit.").
156. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
157. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (restricting to the narrow
category of fighting words the constitutional abridgment of the right to utter insulting, abusive,
and offensive words); N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. 254 (instituting a First Amendment restriction
on a libel cause of action). See also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); A Book Named
"John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Att'y Gen. General, 383 U.S. 413 (1966)
(restricting constitutional bans on works or activities with sexual content to bans on content
meeting the test for obscenity contained in those cases).
158. See, e.g., Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966);
Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
159. Rosemont Enters., 366 F.2d 303; Time, 293 F. Supp. 130.
160. Rosemont Enters., 366 F.2d at 306.
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characterizing fair use as "'a privilege in others than the owner of a
copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner
without his consent, notwithstanding the monopoly granted to the
owner."' 16  According to the court, because the "fundamental
justification" for fair use is advancing progress in the arts and
sciences, "[w]hether the privilege may justifiably be applied to
particular materials turns initially on the nature of the materials, e.g.,
whether their distribution would serve the public interest in the free
dissemination of information and whether their preparation requires
some use of prior materials dealing with the same subject matter."' 162
The court emphasized the public benefit to be created by the
dissemination of the work, a biography of Howard Hughes, and
resoundingly chastised the lower court for its focus upon the
commercial nature of defendant's work, which was a designed for the
popular market rather than academia:
[T]he district court in emphasizing the commercial aspects of the
Hughes biography failed to recognize that "[a]ll publications
presumably are operated for profit" and that "both commercial and
artistic elements are involved in almost every [work]" Thus, we
conclude that whether an author or publisher has a commercial
motive or writes in a popular style is irrelevant to a determination
of whether a particular use of copyrighted material in a work
which offers some benefit to the public constitutes a fair use.
6 3
A concurring opinion to which two judges subscribed expressly raised
free speech concerns; the majority opinion did not. The concurrence
considered the public benefit purpose of copyright and how copyright
laws must yield to the public benefit protected and conferred by the
First Amendment:
The spirit of the First Amendment applies to the copyright laws at
least to the extent that the courts should not tolerate any attempted
interference with the public's right to be informed regarding
matters of general interest when anyone seeks to use the copyright
statute which was designed to protect interests of quite a different
nature. 164
161. Id. at 306 (quoting HORACE G. BALL, LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY
260 (1944)). See also supra note 26 and accompanying text.
162. Rosemont Enters., 366 F.2d at 307.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 311 (Lumbard, J. concurring). Judges Lumbard and Hays, in the concurring
opinion, expressed skepticism that the plaintiff was attempting to protect a copyright interest,
characterizing the plaintiff company as "the instrument of Howard Hughes, created principally
for the purpose of suppressing the biography of Hughes" in order to "restrict the dissemination
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In the Bernard Geis case, the defendants copied a number of
frames from Abraham Zapruder's film of the assassination of
President John F. Kennedy, and then reproduced significant portions
of twenty-two of those frames in the form of "sketches" that
amounted to exact copies of the photographic frames.1 65 The
defendants published those twenty-two sketches in a book criticizing
the Warren Commission's analysis and report. Defendants claimed
that they needed the sketches to effectively demonstrate the book's
alternate analysis of the assassination and that the public interest in
having information on the assassination justified the limited use of
sketches. The district court reviewed the common law doctrine of fair
use, including quotations from Folsom and Rosemont, as well as the
then-current copyright revision bills in the House of Representatives
and the Senate that contained a statutory fair use provision. 166 In
considering "good faith and fair dealing" on the part of defendants,
which the court found to be an important element of fair use, the court
noted that "while hope by a defendant for commercial gain is not a
significant factor in this Circuit, there is a strong point for defendants
in their offer to surrender to Life all profits of Associates from the
Book as royalty payment."' 67 The court's interest in the commercial
nature of the use related to its assessment of the defendant's good
faith. The court was not making a separate judgment that a
commercial use should be viewed as having an inherently lower value
than a noncommercial use, either within copyright or in the public's
interest in dissemination of speech or information.
Ultimately, the court found that the balance of concerns within
the fair use analysis favored the defendants. In so doing, the court
relied heavily on the "public interest in having the fullest information
available on the murder of President Kennedy."'' 68 This public interest
in dissemination of information included the dissemination of
plaintiffs copyrighted expression, even though "doubtless the theory
could be explained with sketches [that were less complete and were
of information about Hughes because he preferred to avoid publicity. Id. For this reason, the
concurring judges viewed the case as significantly invested with free speech concerns.
165. See Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). In
total, the Zapruder film contained 480 frames, 140 showing the immediate events surrounding
the assassination and 40 directly pertinent to the shots that were fired. See id. at 133.
166. See id. at 145. For further discussion of the copyright revision process and the history
of the fair use provision, see supra Part III.D.
167. Id. at 146.
168. Id.
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not true copies].' 169 In addition, the court found little likelihood of
injury to the plaintiffs market for its work because plaintiff did not
sell copies of the Zapruder pictures and the effect of defendant's use
on plaintiff's future projects using the pictures was speculative. 170
Writing soon after the Rosemont and Bernard Geis decisions,
Melville B. Nimmer criticized both decisions for failing to account
for free speech concerns separate and apart from the standard fair use
analysis. While he found Rosemont to be wrongly decided altogether,
he faulted the Bernard Geis analysis without disputing the conclusion
of noninfringement.17 1 In commenting upon the Bernard Geis
opinion, Nimmer argued that there is a "grave danger" in failing to
distinguish copyright doctrines from First Amendment concerns:
[A] grave danger to copyright may lie in the failure to distinguish
between the statutory privilege known as fair use and an emerging
constitutional limitation on copyright contained in the first
amendment. The scope and extent of fair use falls within the
discretion of the Congress. The limitations of the first amendment
are imposed upon Congress itself. Fair use, when properly applied,
is limited to copying by others which does not materially impair
the marketability of the work which is copied. The first
amendment privilege, when appropriate, may be invoked despite
the fact that the marketability of the copied work is thereby
impaired.
17 2
Nimmer argued that fair use, which might excuse the use of
expression, is entirely separate from First Amendment interests,
which he saw as concerned primarily with ideas.173 Under his
analysis, if ideas can be expressed in a second author's own words or
own form of expression, the First Amendment cannot excuse the use,
even if fair use does.
174
Nimmer distinguished between the Bernard Geis case, in which
he thought the First Amendment alone supported exoneration of the
use of the frames of the Zapruder film, from the Rosemont case, in
which he thought the First Amendment would not excuse the use of
the copied expression. 75 And on the Rosemont facts as found by the
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See Nimmer, supra note 6.
172. Id. at 1200-01.
173. Id. at 1201-04.
174. Id. at1203.
175. Id. at 1202. A 1975 article containing extensive commentary on the then-current
status of fair use essentially concurred with Nimmer as to Rosemont and, to a lesser degree,
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district court, he reasoned that fair use should not have applied either.
In his view, the freedom of use of the ideas and facts underlying the
material copied from the magazine articles provided sufficient
protection for speech interests.' 
76
Nimmer argued in part that while the First Amendment might
demand that defendants be free to use copyright-protected expression
in some instances, that freedom should not include a complete
freedom from royalty payments.1 77 In his view, a compulsory license,
rather than free use, should be available in what he thought were the
relatively rare instances of First Amendment protection for use of
expression. 178 And although Nimmer steadfastly argued that "[n]either
the first amendment per se, nor the speech interests which underlie it,
justify in the name of education or culture the expropriation of
authorship," he also acknowledged that the "public's increasing
appetite for education and culture," along with technological
advances, "requires a constant rethinking of the place of copyright
and the proper scope of the first amendment within our burgeoning
society."' 
7 9
Nimmer's analysis in 1970 of the proper role of the First
Amendment as applied to a claim of copyright infringement - that is,
a separate and occasional restraint on copyright claims, rather than a
consideration to be factored into the fair use doctrine - stands in
contrast to the Court's recent assertions on the issue.' 80 It also stands
apart from the views expressed the same year by Paul Goldstein, who
avoided complete exoneration of infringing uses of expression when
defended via the First Amendment, yet approved of fair use as the
Bernard Geis. See Harvey S. Perlman & Laurens H. Rhinelander, Williams & Wilkins Co. v.
United States: Photocopying, Copyright, and the Judicial Process, 1975 Sup. CT. REV. 355,
387-89 (1975) (arguing that both the majority and concurring opinions in Rosemont "raised the
[fair use] issue to unnecessary dimensions" by referencing the public interest (either via the
Copyright Clause or the First Amendment) and asserting that the relevant interests in both
Rosemont and Bernard Geis could be satisfactorily resolved by reference to the idea-expression
dichotomy).
176. In his analysis of the interplay of copyright and the First Amendment, Nimmer
concluded that copyright would, in most instances, stand clear of true interference with the
freedom of speech. He did not rely on the idea-expression distinction alone. Instead, he found
that copyright's limited term [at the time, the initial statutory term was 28 years with the option
of another 28-year renewal term] and "the greater public good in the copyright encouragement
of creative works" combined with the idea-expression distinction to excuse copyright's burden
on speech except in rare cases. Nimmer, supra note 6, at 1192, 1193-1200.
177. Id. at 1199-1200.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1204.
180. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
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means for accommodating speech interests. 181 He noted that using fair
use to excuse "otherwise infringing uses is an explicit objective of the
[copyright] law and rests upon a thoroughly principled basis [namely,
the public interest]. Sanction of the fair use defense - which accredits
the public interest in access to didactic expression - recognizes the
alleged infringer's standing to assert this public interest."'
' 82
Nimmer and Goldstein disagreed on the relative scope and
frequency of a First-Amendment-protected public interest in the use
of copyright-protected expression. They also disagreed on the
appropriateness of using fair use to vindicate that public interest.
They did agree, at least implicitly, that commercial use was irrelevant
to a fair use or First Amendment analysis within copyright. Neither
scholar referenced commercial versus noncommercial uses of
expression in his study of fair use. And neither scholar limited his
analysis of the validity of a First Amendment-public interest
copyright defense to noncommercial contexts.
D. Codification of Fair Use in the 1976 Act
In 1976, Congress codified the judicial doctrine of fair use in
section 107 of the Copyright Act.183 Congress repeatedly asserted that
section 107 simply restated the current judicial doctrine with no
changes, neither narrowing nor enlarging it. 184 Congress also
intended for courts to continue their development of the fair use
doctrine. 85 Operating in the wake of the Rosemont and Bernard Geis
decisions and the Goldstein and Nimmer articles, one would expect
Congress to have addressed how free speech interests should intersect
with section 107, or in the alternative, to have stated that the issue
was appropriate for further judicial development. At the very least,
181. Goldstein, supra note 6.
182. Id. at 1056 (emphasis added). But even Goldstein, while placing significant weight on
the fair use doctrine in accommodating the public interest, emphasized that the idea-expression
distinction "constitutes a more elastic application of the fair use motive; the rules of the
originality requisite and of the idea-expression distinction are uniquely justified by the public
interest that ideas be liberated from monopoly constraint." Id.
183. Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 107, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified at 17 U.S.C
§ 107 (2000)).
184. "Section 107 is intended to restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to
change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way." H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976); S. REP. No.
94-473, at 62 (1975); H.R. REP. No. 89-2237, at 61 (1966). H.R. REP. No. 90-83, at 31 (1967)
(the codification "had no purpose of either freezing or changing the doctrine"); 122 CONG. REC.
3144 (1976) (the proposed language was "a restatement of this judicially developed doctrine...
[not] enlarge[d] or change[d] in any way").
185. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66; S. REP. No. 94-473, at 62.
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one would expect Congress or other participants in the revision
process to have discussed free speech and the First Amendment in the
debates or negotiations surrounding the codification of the fair use
doctrine. But one would be very wrong.
The process of revising the Copyright Act began in earnest as
early as 1955, when Congress authorized the Register of Copyrights
to supervise and conduct a multi-year study of necessary and
advisable revisions to the law.' 8 6 At the time, United States copyright
law was a slightly modified version of the 1909 Copyright Act.'8 7 The
Register's report served as the starting point for organized
Congressional action toward what became the Copyright Act of
1976.18'
Voluminous transcripts and reports documenting the negotiations
and deliberations of the 1960s regarding revision of the copyright
laws exist in the legislative history. Participants in the process
debated fair use at length, but no mention of the First Amendment or
free speech in those fair use debates can be found. 189 The fair use
deliberations before 1965 centered upon whether the new act should
include any express mention of fair use (and if so how extensive) or
whether the new act should leave fair use entirely to the discretion of
the courts, where it then resided.' 90 These initial deliberations
occurred before Rosemont, Bernard Geis, and the scholarly interest of
186. H.R. REP. No. 90-83, at 2.
187. See S. REP. No. 94-473, at 47 (1975); H.R. REP. No. 90-83, at 2 (1967); STAFF OF S.
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: STUDIES
PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, STUDY 1, at 1 (Comm. Print 1960); 122 CONG. REC. 31979 (1976).
188. See H.R. REP. No. 90-83, at 2.
189. See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., 2D SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW
REVISION: PART 4: FURTHER DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS ON PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR
REVISED U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 216-20, 272-73, 291-300, 314-16, 320, 331-32, 350, 359-61,
365-69, 374, 379-80, 395-96, 413, 450-52, 464-65 (Comm. Print 1964) (containing transcript of
advisory panel's discussion of fair use and written comments related to fair use); STAFF OF H.
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., 2D SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: PART 3:
PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR REVISED U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW AND DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS
ON THE DRAFT 6, 158-77, 372, 375-76, 400, 409, 417, 443 (Comm. Print 1964) (containing
proposed fair use provision, transcript of advisory panel's discussion of fair use, and written
comments related to fair use, including commentary by Melville Nimmer); STAFF OF H. COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., IST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: REPORT OF THE
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 24-25
(Comm. Print 1961) (containing Register's comments on fair use); STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE
SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
STUDY 14, at 1-34 (Comm. Print 1960) (reprinting Alan Latman's study on fair use, prepared at
the request of the Committee).
190. See sources cited supra note 189.
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the 1970s in the intersection of copyright and free speech. Thus, the
lack of Congressional attention to the issue is understandable.
By 1965, the several years of negotiations, drafts, and revisions
allowed Congress to consider a relatively thorough copyright revision
bill, H.R. 4347.191 The House Committee on the Judiciary held
hearings and conducted extensive deliberations on the bill. No amount
of reading on or between the lines elicits even a hint that the
Committee's hearings and deliberations on the 1965 bill, or any
parallel activity in the Senate, involved consideration of First
Amendment issues in connection with the doctrine of fair use. 192 If
thought was given by any member of Congress, or any participant in
the relevant discussions or negotiations, to the interplay of free speech
and fair use, that thought was not recorded for posterity.
H.R. 4347, as introduced, briefly addressed fair use in section
107: "the fair use of a copyrighted work is not an infringement of
copyright."' 93 Following testimony and deliberation on the bill, the
Committee revised section 107 to include the following factors for
courts to consider, which factors had previously been part of a short-
lived 1964 proposal:' 
94
(1) the purpose and character of the use; (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.'
9
That four-factored version of section 107 survived unchanged
through almost a decade of additional negotiations, hearings, and
deliberations. Through the entirety of the record from 1965 to 1976,
191. See H.R. 4347, 89th Cong. (Ist Sess. 1965).
192. See S. REP. No. 90-1168, at 8 (1968) (reporting on subcommittee hearings on S. 597,
which was substantially identical to H.R. 4347 as amended and reported by the House
Committee on the Judiciary); H.R. REP. No. 90-83, at 4, 29-37 (1967) (reporting on H.R. 2512,
which was substantially identical to H.R. 4347 as amended and reported by the House
Committee on the Judiciary); H.R. REP. No. 89-2237, at 5, 31-33, 58-66, 194 (1966) (reporting
on committee hearings on H.R. 4347 and amending the bill). Comments on H.R. 2412, which
was substantially identical to H.R. 4347 as amended and reported by the House Committee on
the Judiciary, can be found at 114 CONG. REC. 10346 (1968); 113 CONG. REC. 8501, 8587,
8639, 8996-97, 9019, 9021 (1967). See also 112 CONG. REc. 9409, 24065 (1966) (summarizing
and commenting on H.R. 4347 as amended by subcommittee).
193. H.R. 4347 § 107; H.R. REP. No. 89-2237, at 59.
194. H.R. 11947, 88th Cong. (2d Sess. 1964).
195. See H.R. 4347 § 107; H.R. REP. No 90-83, at 29-30 (discussing the amendments
made to H.R. 4347 by the Committee on the Judiciary during the 89th Congress); H.R. REP. No.
89-2237, at 5, 31 (reporting the amended version of H.R. 4347).
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there is no discussion of the First Amendment or free speech in the
context of fair use. 196 So even after Rosemont and Bernard Geis, as
well as the articles by Nimmer and Goldstein, the fair use-free speech
issue did not arise in connection with section 107.
Much of the fair use debate throughout the revision process
centered upon the education lobby's demand for a blanket exemption
from copyright liability for educational uses, including reproduction
for classroom use.' 9 7 That lobbying appears to have had some effect.
Shortly before the House voted on the 1976 Act in late September
1976, the long-unchanged fair use factors were modified by new
language added to the first factor in the House amendments reported
on September 3, 1976. The House amendments reported on
September 3, 1976 stated the first fair use factor as: "(1) the purpose
and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes."' 9 The
House Report accompanying the September 1976 House amendments
to the Senate bill states that the change was "an express recognition
that, as under the present law, the commercial or non-profit character
of an activity, while not conclusive with respect to fair use, can and
196. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1733, at 7, 70 (1976); H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 5, 65-74, 202
(1976); S. REP. No. 94-473, at 5, 61-67 (1975); S. REP. No. 94-92, at 7 (1975); S. REP. No. 93-
1135, at 7-8 (1974); S. REP. No. 93-983, at 10-11, 115-120 (1974); S. REP. No. 91-1219, at 5
(1970); S. REP. No. 91-519, at 8-9 (1969); S. REP. No. 90-1168, at 8; H.R. REP. No. 90-83, at 4,
29-37; H.R. REP. No. 89-2237, at 5, 31-33, 58-66, 194; 122 CONG. REC. 2817, 2834, 3144,
3835, 3843, 26234, 31980-81, 31983, 31986-89 (1976); 120 CONG. REC. 22411, 30342, 30361,
30402, 30500 (1974); 119 CONG. REC. 9389 (1973); 114 CONG. REC. 10346 (1968); 113 CONG.
REC. 8501, 8587, 8639, 8996-97, 9019, 9021 (1967); 112 CONG. REC. 9409, 24065 (1966). Cf
H.R. REP. No. 90-83, at 254 (mentioning the First Amendment right of freedom of speech, but
only in the context of copyright regulations related to community antenna television (comments
of Rep. Basil L. Whitener)).
197. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 94-1733, at 70; H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65-72; S. REP. No.
93-1135, at 7; S. REP. No. 93-983, at 115-20; S. REP. No. 91-519, at 8; H.R. REP. No. 90-83, at
29-37; H.R. REP. No. 89-2237, at 58-66; STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG.,
2D SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: PART 4: FURTHER DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS ON
PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR REVISED U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 219-20, 331, 350, 359-61, 365-69,
376-80, 413,450-52,464-65 (Comm. Print 1964); 120 CONG. REC. 30402 (1974).
198. Compare S. 22, 94th Cong. § 107 (1975) (text of section 107 before September 3,
1976 amendment), and 122 CONG. REC. 3843 (providing the text of section 107 within S.22, as
it existed on February 19, 1976), and S. REP. No. 94-473, at 5, 62 (1975) (containing the
Judiciary Committee's report on S. 22 and including an unamended section 107), with H.R. REP.
NO. 94-1733, at 70 (1976) (Conf. Rep.) (describing and adopting the House amendments to
section 107 in the conference version of S. 22), and H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 5, 66 (1976)
(adding the phrase "including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes" to the first factor and injecting the parenthetical phrase "(including
multiple copies for classroom use)" after the word "teaching" in the first paragraph of section
107).
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should be weighed along with other factors in fair use decisions."'
' 99
No further explanation or substantiation of that statement exists in the
record. The conference report does not provide any reason for
accepting the amendment as part of the conference bill.200 The House
Report continued to characterize the overall intent behind the section
107 fair use provision as a restatement of the current judicial doctrine
- with no changes. 20 The conference bill passed both the House and
the Senate on September 30, 1976, and President Ford signed it
shortly thereafter. The four factors in section 107 remain unchanged
today.202
E. The Effect of Codification
The legislative history demonstrates that Congress did not intend
for the 1976 Act to alter the fair use doctrine. The late addition of
language regarding commercial and nonprofit educational uses
frustrated that intent. The fact is that Congress did alter the fair use
doctrine in 1976.03 Moreover, even apart from the specific language
chosen for the statute, the very codification of fair use wrought its
own alteration of the previously organic doctrine. The legislative
history indicates that Congress desired for judicial development of
fair use to continue as it had before the 1976 Act.20 4 Nevertheless,
199. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66. As characterized by a later commentator, the addition
of the language was nonsubstantive, and instead "a political sop to an unhappy interest group,
[through recognition] in the statute itself that their type of use was one that might be fair in
appropriate circumstances." PATRY, supra note 118, at 422; William F. Patry & Shira
Perlmutter, Fair Use Misconstrued: Profit, Presumptions, and Parody, II CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 667, 678-79 (1992).
200. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1733 at 70.
201. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476 at 66. See also supra notes 184-185 and accompanying
text.
202. Although the preamble and four factors of section 107 have not changed, the section
has been otherwise amended since the 1976 enactment. In 1990, with the addition of section
106A to the Copyright Act, which added certain moral rights for works of visual art, the
reference to section 106 in the first sentence was expanded to include both sections 106 and
106A. See Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 607, 104 Stat. 5132 (1990). And in 1992 Congress added the
last sentence: "The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such
finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors." Pub. L. No. 102-492, 106 Stat.
3145 (1992).
203. Accord PATRY, supra note 118, at 414. As further detailed in this article, in addition
to focusing attention on commercial versus nonprofit educational purposes, section 107 made
consideration of the four listed factors mandatory. Id.
204. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976); S. REP. No. 94-473, at 62 (1975).
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subsequent development in the courts has not been robust, to the
extent it has occurred at all.
20 5
We can see that the four factors in section 107 echo the passage
from Folsom and later cases in some ways, although not in all
particulars. 20 6 Unlike Justice Story's opinion in Folsom, section 107
makes consideration of the listed factors mandatory. 207 In that regard,
Congress should have recalled Justice Story's express
characterization of fair use as a doctrine wherein no "general
principles applicable to all cases" could be delineated.20 8 By codifying
mandatory factors for a fair use analysis, Congress communicated to
the courts that general principles of fair use applicable to all cases
exist and that the courts are required to apply those principles to all
cases. Despite its stated intentions not to change the doctrine and not
to hinder its judicial development and flexibility, Congress did just
that in 1976.
Particularly disturbing for the alleged flexibility of fair use for
defendants raising First Amendment concerns is the shift in analysis
wrought by the addition of "use ... of a commercial nature" as a
specific consideration for the courts. The added language makes
commercial use a sub-factor within purpose and character of a use.
205. Accord Litman, supra note 144, at 899 ("A copyright scheme needs flexibility, and
the 1976 Act reposes most of that flexibility in its fair use provision. The Court's reformulation
of fair use has restricted its availability for commercial uses, removed its flexibility and tilted
the balance between owners and users to the copyright owners' advantage.").
206. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (providing four nonexclusive factors to consider in
evaluating a claim of noninfringing fair use, including these three: "the purpose and character of
the use, . . . the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work
as a whole[,) and the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work."), with Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901):
[W]e must often, in deciding questions of this sort, look to the nature and objects
of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the
degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or
supersede the objects, of the original work.
William Patry characterizes the first statutory fair use factor as Folsom's first factor "slightly
rephrased." PATRY, supra note 118, at 24. On the other hand, Ray Patterson argued that "the
purpose and character of the use" did not arise from Justice Story's "the nature and objects of
the selections made," contrary to assertions of that ilk by Patry and others. Patterson, supra note
14, at 43 n.141. Patterson advocated instead for an analysis of "nature and objects of the
selections" as referring to the portions of the original work selected for use by the defendant,
rather than the use of those portions within defendant's new work. Id.
207. Despite the fact that section 107 makes the list of factors nonexclusive, few opinions
include considerations beyond those listed, and the interpretation and application of the listed
factors is quite literal and rather inflexible. One additional factor considered in some cases is the
presence or absence of good faith by defendant. See, e.g., PATRY, supra note 118, at 415 n. 14
(listing cases).
208. Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 344.
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Commerciality appears to weigh against fair use in light of its
juxtaposition with "nonprofit educational purposes." This
unexplained financial categorization of the interests served by an
allegedly fair use, elevated as it is by inclusion in the express
language of the statute, has posed an ever-more-problematic
contradiction with First Amendment interests over the years following
its codification.
Section 107 reflects an attempt to define, albeit on a case-by-
case basis, certain uses that are simply not to be included within the
copyright owner's control (including reproductions, performances,
and all other uses implicated by the exclusive rights granted to a
copyright owner). In light of Congress's intent to leave the doctrine
unchanged and allow continued judicial development, the attempt to
define fair use in the Copyright Act may have been misguided.
Regardless of whether the attempt was misguided as a general matter,
it is clear that Congress harbored no particular intent either to
maintain or to modify the doctrine in light of copyright's potential
conflict with free speech interests.
Neither Congress nor the industry members participating in the
addition of section 107 to the Copyright Act ever considered the
intersection of fair use and freedom of speech.20 9 A careful study of
the fair-use-related portions of the voluminous legislative history of
the 1976 Copyright Act reveals no mention of the First Amendment
or the freedom of speech. Congress never intended section 107 to
serve as a safety valve for First Amendment concerns. The previous
jurisprudence of fair use similarly developed largely independent of
free speech concerns.210 Thus, one question remains with respect to
the Court's reliance on fair use to vindicate free speech interests -
namely whether, despite the lack of a historical or structural purpose
to accommodate free speech, fair use does in fact operate with First
Amendment sensitivity.
209. See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., 2D SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW
REVISION: PART 4: FURTHER DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS ON PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR
REVISED U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 216-20, 272-73, 291-300, 314-16, 320, 331-32, 350, 359-61,
365-69, 374, 379-80, 395-96, 413, 450-52, 464-65 (Comm. Print 1964) (containing transcript of
advisory panel's discussion of fair use and written comments related to fair use); STAFF OF H.
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., 2D SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: PART 3:
PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR REVISED U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW AND DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS
ON THE DRAFT 6, 158-77, 372, 375-76, 400, 409, 417, 443 (Comm. Print 1964) (containing
proposed fair use provision, transcript of advisory panel's discussion of fair use, and written
comments related to fair use, including commentary by Melville Nimmer).
210. See supra Part IlA-B.
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IV. MODERN FAIR USE DOCTRINE AND FIRST AMENDMENT
INTERESTS
A. The Fair Use Factors of Section 107
When we analyze the statutory embodiment of fair use for a First
Amendment purpose or First Amendment-sensitive result, we see that
the language of section 107 does not respect, much less conform to,
First Amendment values.2 1' In fact, while certain elements within the
analysis do not interfere with current First Amendment principles as
set forth by the Supreme Court, others elements actually contradict
those principles.
1. Purpose and Character of the Use
The first fair use factor instructs courts to consider "the purpose
and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes. 2 12 The
language of this factor relates back to the first paragraph of section
107, which states broadly that "the fair use of a copyrighted work...
for purposes such as criticism, comment, news report, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
research, is not an infringement of copyright." 21 3 This broad statement
is followed, in turn, by a requirement that a court consider all four of
the listed fair use factors in making a fair use determination.1 4 The
211. Section 107 of the Copyright Act provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords
or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining
whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to
be considered shall include -
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such
finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.
17 U.S.C. § 107,
212. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1).
213. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
214. Id.
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illustrative uses in the first paragraph provide courts with a non-
exclusive list of examples of the types of purposes with positive fair
use value. The "such as" language indicates that additional purposes
or uses of other character may yet be fair; however, the purpose and
character inquiry remains overall an investigation into why the second
use of the expressive material was made. If the inquiry into why the
expressive material was used were sufficiently broad, it could
encompass uses for protected free speech purposes.
But the design of the first fair use factor opposes certain First
Amendment values, both by narrowing the courts' field of vision and
by improperly discriminating between uses of varying purpose and
character. It disadvantages noncommercial speech that has a profit
motive by calling it use of a "commercial nature" and counterposing
that speech against speech for "non-profit educational purposes." All
judges, including the Justices of the Supreme Court, interpret this
juxtaposition to mean that all for-profit uses receive less respect under
the first factor, the purpose and character of the use.2 15 In disfavoring
all "commercial use" by using a profit-motivated line for commercial
use, this factor disfavors most works of fiction, biographies,
newspapers, news broadcasts, political fundraising uses, and even
scholarly works that are published and sold on the market. The First
Amendment does not disfavor these forms of speech; on the contrary,
it provides them with full protection.
The First Amendment does not tolerate discrimination against
speech simply because it is sold for monetary profit (or other reward
to the seller).2 16 Similarly, First Amendment protection does not
diminish merely because a speaker has been paid to print or otherwise
disseminate a message.21 Current First Amendment jurisprudence
does provide lesser protection to "commercial speech," as that term is
215. Courts no longer apply to profitable uses a firm presumption against fair use, but
profit-seeking by the party alleging fair use still weighs in favor of infringement. See Campbell
v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 583-85 (1994). In unambiguously rebuking the lower
courts' application of a legal presumption against commercial uses, the Campbell Court
observed that the presumption would "swallow nearly all of the illustrative uses" in the first
paragraph of section 107, which uses are set forth as the types of uses that may be fair, because
those uses "'are generally conducted for profit in this country."' Id. at 584 (quoting Harper &
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 592 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
216. See, e.g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959) (books are fully protected
speech); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) (motion pictures); Breard v.
Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642 (1951) ("We agree that the fact that periodicals are sold does not
put them beyond the protection of the First Amendment."). See also Va. State Bd, of Pharmacy
v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976).
217. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1964).
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understood in the case law. As set forth in Part II.B.2 above, the
Supreme Court's First Amendment "commercial speech" category is
much narrower than section 107's use "of a commercial nature;" it
does not encompass all profit-motivated or profit-making speech.
With the first factor's focus upon profit, fair use disadvantages much
noncommercial but profit-related speech. Noncommercial not-for-
profit speech is advantaged. The First Amendment does not
countenance such a divide.21 8
2. The Other Fair Use Factors
If the remainder of the fair use analysis included an express
balance and consideration of First Amendment interests, of course,
the difficulties presented by the first factor might be of little ultimate
consequence. After all, none of the factors are dispositive, and all are
to be considered. The problem is that while the remaining factors may
coordinate well with within copyright, i.e., accommodating second-
user creativity without overly damaging first-user reward, the
remaining factors do not contain any First Amendment sensitivity that
can salvage the damage done under the express language of the first
factor.
The second fair use factor, which directs a court to consider "the
nature of the copyrighted work,, 21 9 favors fictional, creative works
over non-fiction, factual works. This means that a fictional work is
less likely to be found to have been fairly used than a factual work, all
other considerations being equal. This factor re-emphasizes the idea-
expression distinction within copyright220 and copyright's lack of
protection for facts even when those facts are contained within
copyright-protected expression.22' It does not speak to any First
Amendment issue outside the idea-expression and fact-expression
distinctions.222
218. See Va. State Bd.,425 U.S. at 761. See also supra Part ll.B.2.
219. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2000).
220. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
221. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
222. Insofar as we believe in the Constitutional clause's statement that copyright is
designed to promote learning, it might seem that promotion of learning is indeed enhanced by
making factual works "easier" to fairly use. At the same time, if we think of our copyright
system as a utilitarian-reward system, the second fair use factor actually discourages (in a
relative sense) the creation of idea-factual works in favor of the creation of fictional, creative
works in light of the greater protection of fictional-creative works by virtue of their treatment
within fair use. As such, the second factor may in fact contravene the system of utilitarian
rewards intended to enhance learning, if indeed learning is more enhanced by idea-factual
dissemination than by creative dissemination.
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The third fair use factor is "the amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole. 223 The
qualitative "value" of the expression to the original work receives
consideration along with the quantitative amount.224 In general, this
provides the creator of a second work some limited leeway to use a
small amount of expression from a copyright-protected work as long
as the use does not take the core or heart of the original work. In
copyright policy terms, the ability to use a limited amount of
copyrighted material supports an overall increase in authorial
productivity while attempting to avoid the interference with monetary
and non-monetary rewards to copyright owners that might occur with
extensive uses of expressive material. This overall increase in creative
production is accomplished by providing comfort and protection for
some of the appropriate borrowing and cross-fertilization that is
necessary for a new work.
While a clear connection to internal copyright policy exists, there
is no operative connection between the third factor and free speech.
Within First Amendment jurisprudence, the amount of expression a
speaker projects is irrelevant. Movies and novels have been protected
just as much as Cohen's brief statement, "Fuck the Draft., 225 I do not
argue that the third fair use factor rises to the level of violating a First
Amendment principle, as I do with the first factor. Nonetheless, the
analysis of quantity and quality does not possess any First
Amendment benefits that ameliorate the damage done under the first
factor.
The final fair use factor, the effect of the use on the value of or
the market for the copyrighted work,226 clearly attempts to vindicate
copyright's internal purpose of motivating production by providing
for authorial reward. The factor tries to avoid significant interference
with the reward that is "due" the author under our system, even while
tolerating insignificant interferences. In contrast, when the First
Amendment is at stake, we never ask what the financial effect was
upon the target of speech or on competing speech being disseminated
by others. Money is not the issue. The only time that the commercial
purpose of particular speech matters in today's First Amendment
223. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3).
224. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564-66 (1985).
225. Compare Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) with Smith v. California, 361 U.S.
147, 150 (1959) (books) and Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) (motion
pictures).
226. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4).
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doctrine is when the speech is deemed to be "commercial speech. 227
As explained above in Part I1.B.2, "commercial speech" as seen
through a First Amendment lens is a narrow category that excludes
many forms of profit-oriented speech. 228 As with the previous factor,
the analysis does not expressly encroach upon First Amendment
values. The calculus in the fourth factor again demonstrates, however,
that the current statutory fair use factors are not actually designed or
tailored to accommodate First Amendment concerns in any particular
way.
B. The Supreme Court's Fair Use Analysis
The history of fair use through 1976 and the foregoing analysis
of the statutory factors demonstrate, and in some respects explain, the
lack of express sensitivity to the First Amendment in the early
doctrine and in the statute. The history and statutory language cannot,
on the other hand, explain the Court's continued reliance on section
107 as a savior of free speech. 229 The Court has not explained its
reliance, either, although it has heard four cases including a
significant fair use component since the 1976 Act took effect.
230
Moreover, the Supreme Court's judicial gloss on the speech-
insensitive fair use analysis only obliquely relates to modern First
Amendment principles.
1. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.
In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,23 the
Court's first fair use decision,232 the parties disputed the fair or unfair
nature of the use of video tape recorders by individuals to record
copyright-protected television shows for later viewing. The Court
referred to this individual recording as "time-shifting., 233 Although
the Court would later "correct" lower court interpretation of Sony as
227. See supra Part I1.B.2.
228. Id.
229. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 187, 221 (2003); Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560.
230. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994); Stewart v. Abend, 495
U.S. 207 (1990); Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 539; Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
231. Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 417.
232. The Court had heard two previous cases involving fair use, but each time the Court
was equally divided and issued no opinion. See Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 420
U.S. 376 (1975) (per curiam), aff'g by an equallv divided Court 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973);
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Loew's Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958) (per curiam), aff'g by an equally
divided Court Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956).
233. Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 421.
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providing for a presumption of unfair use when a defendant engaged
in an allegedly infringing use for profit,234 a fair reading of the case
does emphasize the commerciality, or profit-oriented nature of a
use. 235 The noncommercial nature of consumer time-shifting favored
Sony's fair use defense of the practice of time-shifting on both the
first and fourth factors.236
With respect to the first fair use factor, the Court understood that
the statutory language required consideration of the "'commercial or
nonprofit character of an activity,"' although the determination on
that point would not be conclusive.23 7 The Court then stated,
If the Betamax [the video tape recorder in question] were used to
make copies for a commercial or profit-making purpose, such use
would presumptively be unfair. The contrary presumption is
appropriate here, however, because the District Court's findings
plainly establish that time-shifting for private home use must be
characterized as a noncommercial, nonprofit activity.
238
The analysis of the first fair use factor ended there. The Court
discussed no other aspect of the purpose and character of the use.
With respect to the second factor, the Court without elaboration
seemed to conclude that the nature of televised copyrighted
audiovisual works favored fair use, despite the fact that those works
can be either factual or fictional or anywhere in between.239 And
although time-shifting involved the recording of entire works, the
Court found that because the copyright owners allowed the initial
viewing to occur free of charge, the third factor also did not weigh
against fair use.240 As to the fourth factor, effect upon the market for
or value of the work, the Court concluded that it did not prevent a
finding of fair use because the plaintiff copyright owners had not
provided sufficient evidence to prove that time-shifting was either
234. See infra Part lV.B.4
235. See Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 448-5 1.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 448-49 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1476 (1976)).
238. Id. at 449.
239. Id. at 449-50:
Moreover, when one considers the nature of a televised copyrighted audiovisual
work, see 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (1982 ed.), and that time-shifting merely enables a
viewer to see such a work which he had been invited to witness in its entirety free
of charge, the fact that the entire work is reproduced, see § 107(3), does not have
its ordinary effect of militating against a finding of fair use.
240. Id.
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harmful at the time or would become harmful to the market for the
works if it became more widespread.24'
2. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises
In the Court's next fair use case, Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.
v. Nation Enterprises,242 analysis of the purpose and character of the
alleged infringing use focused not only upon the commerciality of
defendant's use, but also upon the defendant's "stated purpose of
scooping" the upcoming publication of plaintiffs work and
defendant's knowing exploitation of a "purloined manuscript.,
243
Defendant Nation Enterprises published in The Nation Magazine
qualitatively substantial excerpts from President Gerald Ford's soon-
to-be-published autobiography, focusing largely upon Ford's pardon
of President Richard Nixon. The facts that the autobiography had not
yet been published and that The Nation had known its possession of
the pre-publication manuscript was unauthorized both weighed
heavily in the Court's decision ruling against the claim of fair use.
24 4
The unpublished nature of the plaintiffs work weighed against fair
use not only under the first factor, but also under the second. The
Court held that "the scope of fair use is narrower with respect to
unpublished works ... [because] [t]he right of first publication
241. Id. at 450-54. The Court expanded upon its view of the market-effects analysis as
follows:
The purpose of copyright is to create incentives for creative effort. Even copying
for noncommercial purposes may impair the copyright holder's ability to obtain
the rewards that Congress intended him to have. But a use that has no
demonstrable effect upon the potential market for, or the value of, the
copyrighted work need not be prohibited in order to protect the author's incentive
to create. The prohibition of such noncommercial uses would merely inhibit
access to ideas without any countervailing benefit.
Thus, although every commercial use of copyrighted material is
presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to
the owner of the copyright, noncommercial uses are a different matter. A
challenge to a noncommercial use requires proof either that the particular use is
harmful, or that if it should become widespread, it would adversely affect the
potential market for the copyrighted work ..... What is necessary is a showing
by a preponderance of the evidence that some meaningful likelihood of future
harm exists. If the intended use is for commercial gain, that likelihood may be
presumed. But if it is for a noncommercial purpose, the likelihood must be
demonstrated.
Id. at 450-51.
242. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
243. Id. at 562-63.
244. Id.
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encompasses not only the choice whether to publish at all, but also the
choices of when, where, and in what form first to publish a work. 245
In commenting upon the commercial or profit-oriented nature of
the defendant's use in its discussion of the first fair use factor, the
Court repeated its statement from Sony that "every commercial use of
copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair exploitation" of the
copyright owner's rights.246 It followed that general statement with
this rationale: "The crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction is not
whether the sole motive of the use is monetary gain but whether the
user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material
without paying the customary price." 247 In so doing, the Court appears
to have blended the first and fourth factors to some degree, without
additional explanation.
The Court acknowledged that another aspect of the purpose and
character of the defendant's use was news reporting, but discounted
that purpose on the basis that The Nation had not merely reported
unprotected information and facts, but had instead made an
unauthorized first publication of Ford's copyrighted expression.248
The distinction between the use of facts and the use of expression
within the analysis of the purpose and character of the use echoes the
Court's earlier discussion in the case of some aspects of the interplay
of copyright and free speech. The defendant had argued that First
Amendment principles, namely the public interest in the content and
manner of expression of Ford's memoirs, mandated a decision on fair
use opposite the Court's general view that, in almost all instances, an
"author's right to control the first public appearance of his
undisseminated expression will outweigh a claim of fair use., 249 In
responding to this argument, the Court emphasized the role of the
idea-expression distinction as the means within copyright of
balancing free speech and an author's exclusive rights. According to
the Court, the defendant's theory would "expand fair use to
effectively destroy any expectation of copyright protection in the
work of a public figure., 250 The court further stated:
In view of the First Amendment protections already embodied
in the Copyright Act's distinction between copyrightable
245. Id. at 564.
246. Id. at 562; Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 451.
247. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562.
248. Id. at 561.
249. Id. at 555-56.
250. Id. at 557.
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expression and uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and the latitude for
scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by fair use, we see
no warrant for expanding the doctrine of fair use to create what
amounts to a public figure exception to copyright.
251
While the Court did rely in part on "the latitude for scholarship
and comment traditionally afforded by fair use," it relied primarily on
the idea-expression distinction to deny further expansion of the scope
of purpose and character of a use to accomplish a broader vision of
the role of free speech within fair use. 2 This limited view of the free
speech utility of fair use, considering primarily scholarship and
comment as traditionally fair uses of expression, devitalized the role
of fair use as a protector of free speech.
The Court rejected the notion that the content of the allegedly
infringed work - subject matter of great public interest - should
excuse an otherwise infringing use: "It is fundamentally at odds with
the scheme of copyright to accord lesser rights in those works that are
of greatest importance to the public. Such a notion ignores the major
premise of copyright and injures author and public alike. '2 53 In
response to the Court's concern, I would argue that broadening the
vision of purpose and character of a use to include considerations
such as the value to the public of further dissemination of some
expression need not fully excuse any particular use. That broader
vision would only become one more factor in the overall fair use
balance. As the Court has repeatedly stated, no one factor is
dispositive.254
One difficulty in the Court's ability or desire to use Harper &
Row as the vehicle to either affirm or recreate fair use as an
embodiment of broad First Amendment values may have been that the
defendant sought to excuse a qualitatively substantial use of
expression, characterized by the District Court as "essentially the
heart of the book. 2 55 The qualitative value of the expression used
caused the third fair use factor to weigh heavily against a finding of
fair use. Similarly, the fourth factor also powerfully favored the
plaintiff. Having characterized the fourth factor as "undoubtedly the
251. Id. at 560.
252. Id. at 557-60.
253. Id. at 559.
254. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577-78 (1994); Harper &
Row, 471 U.S. at 560; Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448
(1984).
255. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 557 F. Supp. 1067, 1072 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) (quoted in Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 565).
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single most important element of fair use," the Court went on to
emphasize the actual effect of The Nation's use upon the plaintiffs
arrangement with Time Magazine for pre-publication serialization.
256
Referring to the article by defendant, Time had cancelled the
serialization and refused to pay the full amount that would have been
due to plaintiff under the arrangement. According to the Court, this
was "clear-cut evidence of actual damage" to the market for or value
of the copyrighted work. 257 As such, the Court stated that the burden
shifted to defendant to rebut this prima facie case of damage.
According to the Court, the defendant failed to do so.25 8 The last two
factors in the fair use analysis weighed very heavily against fair use,
perhaps so heavily that no showing on the other two factors could
save the defense. Thus, it is little wonder that the Court declined to
effectuate the defendant's proposed rule or exception, which was to
allow free speech interests related to publishing information on public
figures to override the "traditional" doctrine of fair use, rather than
only to provide an interpretive guidepost. As put by the Court,
"Congress has not designed, and we see no warrant for judicially
imposing, a 'compulsory license' permitting unfettered access to the
unpublished copyrighted expression of public figures.'
259
3. Stewart v. Abend
The Court's third encounter with fair use, in Stewart v. Abend,26°
provided no reason to seriously consider free speech concerns within
the first fair use factor or any other element of the fair use analysis.
Abend owned by assignment the copyright in a short story, "It Had to
Be Murder," during the renewal term of copyright.261 That story
formed the basis of the movie "Rear Window." As an alternative
argument to the primary issue of rights in a derivative work following
expiration of a grant of rights to the pre-existing work, the distributors
of the movie "Rear Window" argued that use of the short story in the
movie during the renewal term was a noninfringing fair use.2 6 2 At the
256. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566-67.
257. Id. at 567.
258. Id. at 567-69.
259. Id. at 569.
260. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990).
261. Id. at 212.
262. Id. at 236. The fair use claim in this case would certainly not have been accepted for
review by the Court had it not been part of a case presenting an important issue upon which the
circuits were split: whether the owner of copyright in a derivative work infringed the rights in
the pre-existing work by distributing the derivative work during the renewal term of copyright,
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Court of Appeals, the distributors claimed that the use was
"educational" rather than "commercial" and thus should be
considered fair, particularly with respect to the first fair use factor.263
Without support in the record for that claim, and with all three of the
remaining factors weighing against a finding of fair use, the assertion
of fair use failed miserably. Following its general explication of the
parameters of fair use, including repetition of its Sony statement about
the impact of a commercial use,264 the Court devoted few words to its
analysis of fair use and easily dispensed with the issue.
4. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.
In the most recent fair use decision by the Court, Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,265 the defendants, members of the rap group 2
Live Crew, admitted to using some of the expression from the
plaintiffs work, "Oh, Pretty Woman," in creating their new work,
"Pretty Woman." The sole issue before the Supreme Court was fair
use. In overturning the district court's grant of summary judgment to
2 Live Crew finding fair use, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit emphasized the commercial nature of the use as weighing
against two of the four fair use factors, citing the Sony decision on the
first fair use factor and Harper & Row on the fourth factor. 266 The
Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings after
resoundingly clarifying Sony: according to the Court, Sony did not
call for a presumption against fair use in a case of commercial use.
Instead, Sony only included commerciality as one of many factors to
be weighed in a fair use analysis:
267
The Court of Appeals's elevation of one sentence from Sony to a
per se rule thus runs as much counter to Sony itself as to the long
common-law tradition of fair use adjudication. Rather, as we
explained in Harper & Row, Sony stands for the proposition that
the "fact that a publication was commercial as opposed to
when the author and original assignor of rights to create the derivative work died before he was
able to convey rights in the renewal term of the pre-existing work.
263. Id. at 237.
264. See id. ("The motion picture neither falls into any of the categories enumerated in §
107 nor meets the four criteria set forth in § 107. '[E]very [unauthorized] commercial use of
copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that
belongs to the owner of the copyright."' (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984))).
265. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
266. Id. at 573-74.
267. Id. at 584-85.
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nonprofit is a separate factor that tends to weigh against a finding
of fair use."
268
While a finding of commercial use still creates a heavy burden
for the defendant to overcome, it is no longer a death knell following
the Court's "correction" of lower courts' interpretation of its
comment in Sony that commercial uses are presumptively unfair uses.
In Campbell, the Court was careful to note that while commerciality
does weigh against a fair use, it is not dispositive and does not create
a presumption in a procedural sense.269 And in Campbell, despite not
questioning whether 2 Live Crew's musical work was a use of a
commercial nature, the Court did recognize that commerciality - if
made presumptively unfair and solely equated with profit - would
swallow all of the often-fair purposes of a use listed in section 107,
including comment, criticism, news reporting and the like.270 The
Campbell Court even quoted Samuel Johnson: "No man but a
blockhead ever wrote, except for money." 271 So while the Court
acknowledged that making money is not really the issue in fair use, it
did not ultimately redirect the attention of courts away from using a
profit-nonprofit distinction within the first factor or otherwise reorient
the commercial use issue within purpose and character of a use. The
commercial nature of a use within the first factor is still judged
largely by the question of profit.2 72
In Campbell the Court also emphasized that commerciality is not
the only relevant characteristic bearing upon "purpose and character
of the use." According to the Court, the "transformative" nature of a
use has a significant role to play: the more transformative a use, the
less relevant other aspects of purpose and character of the use,
including its commerciality. 273 The Court construed the "purpose and
character" of the allegedly infringing use as implicating two elements
from Folsom: "the nature and objects of the selections made" within
268. Id. at 585 (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
562 (1985)).
269. Id. at 583-85.
270. Id. at 584.
271. Id. (quoting 3 BOSWELL'S LIFE OF JOHNSON 19 (G. Hill ed. 1934)).
272. In dicta, the Court did assert in Campbell that the use of a work "to advertise a
product, even in a parody, will be entitled to less indulgence under the first factor of the fair use
enquiry than the sale of a parody for its own sake, let alone one performed a single time by
students in school." Id. at 585. The Court thereby alluded to a range of commerciality, a range
that one might compare to commercial speech doctrine, but it did not actually set forth any
standard for a lower court to apply. For discussion of some implications of using a range of
commerciality, see infra note 318.
273. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579, 584-85.
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the allegedly infringing work and whether that work "supersede[s] the
objects" of the original work.274 According to the Court, the thrust of
the inquiry on the first factor is whether the allegedly infringing work
"adds something new, with a further purpose or different character,
altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in
other words, whether and to what extent the new work is
'transformative., 275 The Court states that encouraging the creation of
transformative works, or at least allowing their creation to potentially
survive an infringement claim, furthers "the goal of copyright, to
promote science and the arts. 276 Because the Court thought the 2
Live Crew song could reasonably be perceived to contain a parodic
character, it reasonably could be classed as a transformative use:
"Like less ostensibly humorous forms of criticism, [parody] can
provide social benefit, by shedding light on an earlier work, and, in
the process, creating a new one."
277
Campbell's assessment of transformative uses focuses upon the
value of those uses in pursuit of copyright's internal constitutional
goal. Campbell did not tie either transformative uses or copyright's
constitutional goal to the external question of First Amendment
interests. At the same time, it did not state that only transformative
works can claim to further the internal goal of copyright, and it did
not foreclose consideration of First Amendment interests within the
first fair use factor. By stating that transformative works "lie at the
heart of the fair use doctrine's guarantee of breathing space within the
confines of copyright,, 278 the Court did not preclude the possibility
that other allegedly infringing works might also lie within fair use's
"breathing space," or even at its heart.
5. Postscript: Eldred v. Ashcroft
Only one of the Court's four fair use cases, Harper & Row,
decided in 1985, included any discussion of the First Amendment.2 79
More recently, the Court explicitly tied free speech to fair use in
another copyright case, the Eldred decision of 2003 .280 Eldred did not
include any substantive analysis of fair use; it was not a fair use case.
274. Id. at 578-79 (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No.
4,901)).




279. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985).
280. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 187, 221 (2003).
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The Court relied on the existence of the fair use doctrine in
responding to the plaintiff-petitioner's claim that the Copyright Term
Extension Act of 1998 should be subject to direct First Amendment
scrutiny.281 The only authority cited in Eldred for relying on fair use
to dismiss the request for First Amendment scrutiny was Harper &
Row,282 and the Court did not further expand on its reasoning.
C. Fair Use in the Lower Courts
With the insensitive fair use factors and no real free speech gloss
from the Supreme Court to guide them, it is no wonder that the lower
courts rarely balance free speech interests with copyright interests
when applying the fair use defense.283 The only real consistency in the
as-yet-limited judicial treatment of First Amendment claims within
copyright's fair use doctrine is the courts' reliance upon the first
factor, the purpose and character of the use, as the primary factor
accommodating free speech-related concerns.284 While this might be
appropriate in the abstract, at this time the approach is problematic as
a practical matter. As discussed above, the current language and
current interpretation of the first fair use factor do not lend themselves
to sensitive accommodation of First Amendment concerns.
Following Campbell, lower courts transitioned from the post-
1976 view of the first factor as almost exclusively a
commercial/noncommercial question (or commercial/nonprofit
educational question) to a binary inquiry into both commerciality and
281. Seeid at218-22.
282. Seeid. at219.
283. In order to reach a consciously free-speech-sensitive result, it might be argued that
courts would be required to stretch the more standard concepts of fair use even while ostensibly
applying the doctrine in a faithful manner. See, e.g., Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House,
Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966); Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130
(S.D.N.Y. 1968). See also Nimmer, supra note 6 (supporting the absence of First Amendment
considerations within fair use but arguing for limited First Amendment considerations within
copyright doctrine as a whole).
284. See, e.g., Rosemont, 366 F.2d 303; Bernard Geis, 293 F. Supp. 130. See also Suntrust
Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1264 (lth Cir. 2001) (considering the
intersection of copyright and free speech before applying the four fair use factors and focusing
upon transformation and market harm when concluding that the defendant would likely succeed
in its fair use defense); Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc. v. Gen. Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044,
1049 (2d Cir. 1983); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 206-08
(2d Cir. 1983) (focusing upon the news reporting purpose of the use), rev'd, 471 U.S. 539
(1985). Cf Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 539 (discussing the defendant's asserted First
Amendment "public figure" defense in the context of the first and second factors but ultimately
denying the defense). See also Patry & Perlmutter, supra note 199, at 685 (arguing that in
appropriate circumstances, courts may consider the First Amendment within purpose and
character of the use, citing as authority both Rosemont and Bernard Geis).
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transformation.285 While some courts have since 1976 expressly
considered other elements within "purpose and character of the
use,'286 many or even most currently analyze only commercial use
and transformative use. 287 Neither sub-factor prompts courts to
consider the First Amendment in any depth.
In connection with this article, I performed a comprehensive
survey of all district and appellate court decisions that include any
discussion of the meaning of commercial use within section 107.
There are more than 200 such cases, yet they contain very little
judicial analysis of the meaning or relevance of commercial use. The
285. Unfortunately, some decisions still focus upon commercial use alone, even after the
Court's statement in Campbell that commercial use does not create a presumption against fair
use. See, e.g., Lamb v. Starks, 949 F. Supp. 753 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Itar-Tass Russian News
Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Robinson v. Random
House, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
286. Courts that include considerations other than commercial and transformative use
within the first factor, purpose and character of a use, most often look at bad faith. See, e.g.,
Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 255-56 (2d Cir. 2006) (failing to seek permission for a use is
not in itself evidence of bad faith); NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 478 (2d Cir.
2004) (breaching a confidentiality agreement in connection with the alleged infringement is
evidence of bad faith); Nuflez v. Caribbean Int'l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 2000)
(considering good faith as well as commercial use and transformation of the original works into
news, i.e., the original photographs themselves were part of the controversy being covered by
the news story in which the photographs were reproduced); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 309
(2d Cir. 1992) (removing the copyright symbol from the original work is evidence of bad faith);
Weissman v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1324 (2d Cir. 1989) (deleting plaintiff author's name and
substituting defendant's name damages the defendant's ability to utilize the equitable defense of
fair use); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1986)
(copying the copyrighted work in order to respond to and comment upon a personal attack made
in that copyrighted work weighs in favor of defendant within purpose and character of a use);
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562 (copying from a purloined manuscript indicates bad faith). See
also Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1175-76 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding impropriety in
defendant's conduct because defendant had not sought permission and had copied the original
work without providing credit to the original source).
287. See, e.g., Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm't, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 198-
200 (3rd Cir. 2003); Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 800-03 (9th Cir.
2003); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1269 (11 th Cir. 2001); Infinity
Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 107-09 (2d Cir. 1998); Los Angeles News Serv. v.
Reuters Television Int'l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987, 993-94 (9th Cir. 1998); Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v.
Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1401 (9th Cir. 1997); Toho Co. v. William Morrow
and Co., 33 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1216-17 (C.D. Cal. 1998); Storm Impact, Inc. v. Software of the
Month Club, 13 F. Supp. 2d 782, 787-88 (N.D. Il1. 1998) (utilizing only transformative and
profit/non-profit use in its analysis despite characterizing the purpose and character inquiry as an
examination of "whether the particular use made of copyrighted material was necessary to the
asserted purpose" and "whether the defendant reproduced the copyright owner's expression for
the purpose of marketing the precise form of that expression or for the purpose of making his
own additional statement."). But see Blanch, 467 F.3d at 251-56 (considering the elements of
transformation, commercial use, and bad faith, as well as a fourth category of parody, satire and
justification for the copying).
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decisions focus primarily on a defendant's pursuit of commercial
gain, or profit.2 8 Some decisions broaden the category even further,
holding that, for example, a use can be for profit, and thus disfavored,
even in the largely unremunerative world of academia, because a
defendant can benefit personally or professionally from copying
despite the lack of a monetary gain.289 The vast majority of lower
court decisions on the first factor do not indicate that courts attempt to
consider the overall relevance of commercial use to the fair use
inquiry or any variability within the category of commercial uses.290
When a use is for a commercial purpose, the courts weigh that fact
against fair use (after Campbell, this weight is lighter when the use is
288. The cases after Campbell do provide a more nuanced analysis than prior cases, but
the majority of the newer cases still consider the distinction a dichotomous one - commercial or
noncommercial use - with nothing in between. The effect of Campbell is largely in the weight
placed upon a finding of commercial use in cases where the use was also transformative.
289. See, e.g., Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1324 (2d Cir. 1989).
290. See, e.g., Video Pipeline, 342 F.3d at 198-200 (limiting discussion of commercial use
in the first factor to the finding that the use was commercial because the defendant charged a fee
for its service); Mattel, 353 F.3d at 803 (finding that the defendant artist engaged in a
commercial use because he "had a commercial expectation and presumably hoped to find a
market for his art," but also determining that the transformative nature of the use outweighed its
commercial purpose); Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1269 (characterizing the allegedly infringing
work as "undoubtedly a commercial product" because it was published for profit, without any
further analysis of commerciality, despite the fact that the work criticized the original,
particularly the race relations depicted therein); Los Angeles News Serv., 149 F.3d at 994 (not
distinguishing between commercial news reporting and other commercial purposes in
considering the first fair use factor); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d
349, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (characterizing defendant's use as highly commercial, although it was
a free service, because defendant sought to make a profit by other means); Toho Co., 33 F.
Supp. 2d at 1217 (concluding without analysis that a book was a "purely commercial use"). But
see Blanch, 467 F.3d at 254:
It can hardly be said.., that the defendants' economic gains from [the
accused work] were 'to the exclusion of broader public benefits."
Notwithstanding the fact that artists are sometimes paid and museums sometimes
earn money, the public exhibition of art is widely and we think properly
considered to "have value that benefits the broader public interest."
(citations omitted); Ntihez, 235 F.3d at 22:
For a commercial use to weigh heavily against a finding of fair use, it must
involve more than simply publication in a profit-making venture.... We
agree ... that the commercial use here, however, constitutes more than mere
reproduction for a profitable use. The photographs were used in part to create an
enticing lead page that would prompt readers to purchase the newspaper. Thus El
Vocero used the photograph not only as an ordinary part of a profit-making
venture, but with emphasis in an attempt to increase its revenue.
See also Higgins v. Detroit Educ. Television Found., 4 F. Supp. 2d 701, 705 (E.D. Mich. 1998)
(noting that "[tihe fact that a charge is made for a work, or that a profit is anticipated ... does
not convert the use into a commercial one. . . . 'The commercial nature of a use is a matter of
degree, not an absolute.. (quoting Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1262
(2d Cir. 1986)).
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also transformative), and then the courts move on without further
discussion.2 9'
Since Campbell, most courts have begun to analyze uses for the
presence or absence of a transformative character. They seem most
comfortable with finding a transformative, and thus a fair-use-
favorable, use when the use is also negatively critical of the original
work.292 The courts do not, by and large, inquire as to the relationship
of the specific use in question to either copyright interests or First
Amendment interests.293 If any rationale is provided for the court's
291. See, e.g., Video Pipeline, 342 F.3d at 198-200; Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1269;
Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 141-42 (2d Cir. 1998); Los
Angeles News Serv., 149 F.3d at 994; Dr. Seuss, 109 F.3d at 1401. But see Blanch, 467 F.3d at
253-54 (explaining that because transformative works are less likely to be market substitutes for
the original work, the commercialism of a transformative use is less significant to the fair use
analysis); Mattel, 353 F.3d at 803 (the commercialism of a transformative use is less significant
to the fair use analysis).
292. See Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1270 (emphasizing, throughout the discussion of
transformation, the fact that the new work criticized the original work: "[The new work] is more
than an abstract, pure fictional work. It is principally and purposefully a critical statement that
seeks to rebut and destroy the perspective, judgments, and mythology of [the original]."); Dr.
Seuss, 109 F.3d at 1400-01 (considering only parody targeting the original work, and not satire,
to be the type of transformative work favoring fair use). But see Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336
F.3d 811, 819 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding a transformative use where the allegedly infringing use
served a different function and purpose than the original work).
293. In reviewing recent case law, I found but a few examples of courts going beyond the
details of the fair use "test" to include consideration of the relationship of the specific use to the
broader purposes of copyright. Most courts simply walked mechanically through the fair use
factors. Decisions in which courts did go beyond the details of the fair use factors to include
broader interests generally did so by referring to the "public interest" underlying copyright law.
See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 722 (9th Cir. 2007) (analyzing
purpose and character of a use with reference to the purposes of copyright, noting that the
Supreme Court "has directed us to be mindful of the extent to which a use promotes the
purposes of copyright and serves the interest of the public"); Blanch, 467 F.3d at 254:
It can hardly be said ... that the defendants' economic gains from [the accused
work] were "to the exclusion of broader public benefits." Notwithstanding the
fact that artists are sometimes paid and museums sometimes earn money, the
public exhibition of art is widely and we think properly considered to "have value
that benefits the broader public interest."
(citations omitted). See also Kelly, 336 F.3d at 820 (considering, within purpose and character of
the use, the court's judgment that the use of the copyright owner's work "promotes the goals of
the Copyright Act and the fair use exception. The [use does] not stifle artistic creativity
because ... [it does] not supplant the need for the originals. In addition, [the use] benefit[s] the
public by enhancing information-gathering techniques on the internet."); Castle Rock Entin't,
150 F.3d at 141 (tying fair use analysis to the Copyright Clause but not to the First Amendment:
"The ultimate test of fair use.., is whether the copyright law's goal of 'promot[ing] the
Progress of Science and useful Arts,' U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 8, 'would be better served by
allowing the use than by preventing it."' (quoting Arica Inst., Inc. v. Palmer, 970 F.2d 1067,
1077 (2d Cir. 1992)). 1 found only one case that explicitly utilized the First Amendment in
rulingfor an infringement defendant on the issue of fair use. See infra note 295.
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analysis, or the value of transformation, it is generally only a
repetition of language from Campbell.294 While exceptions to this
general pattern exist, only one recent fair use decision has credited a
defendant's assertion of First Amendment rights and has been based
on a balancing of the public benefits or interests promoted by the
varied purposes of copyright and the First Amendment.295
V. REINTERPRETING AND REVISING FAIR USE TO BETTER PROTECT
FREE SPEECH
The language of the fair use statute provides little guidance for,
and also little express restraint on, a court's application of fair use to
vindicate or deny relief to an asserted free speech interest. The listed
294. See, e.g., Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1269-71.
295. See id. at 1257. In Suntrust, the Eleventh Circuit included First Amendment
considerations in its analysis of a preliminary injunction that had been granted to restrain
publication of a novel alleged to infringe on the copyright in Margaret Mitchell's book Gone
with the Wind Id. at 1265. The novel was defended as a parody that criticized Gone with the
Wind, particularly the race relations depicted therein. Id. at 1270. The primary link noted by the
court between fair use and the First Amendment was the fact that some criticism and comment
can be protected via fair use. Id. at 1265 ("[T]he narrower question in this case is to what extent
a critic may use the protected elements of an original work of authorship to communicate her
criticism without infringing the copyright in that work. . . . [Tihis becomes essentially an
analysis of the fair use factors."). But while Suntrust has been hailed as a case giving more
positive attention to First Amendment interests than any other recent copyright case, the court
did little to advance critical analysis of the relationship of fair use to free speech. The court
limited its analysis of speech interests to the idea-expression dichotomy and the fair use defense.
Id. at 1264-65. It also made the unsupported, broad assertion that "First Amendment privileges
are [ ] preserved through the doctrine of fair use. Until codification of the fair-use doctrine in the
1976 Act, fair use was a judge-made right developed to preserve the constitutionality of
copyright legislation by protecting First Amendment values." Id. at 1264 (emphasis added).
Given current application of the fair use factors (detailed in other portions of this article), by
continuing to rely on fair use as it currently exists, these statements hurt rather than help future
defendants' attempts to use fair use to vindicate speech interests. And in the end, the court's
decision to vacate the preliminary injunction did not arise from an expressly speech-sensitive
application of fair use. Instead, its decision was based on the court's balancing of the irreparable
harm and public interest factors within analysis of the propriety of a preliminary injunction, as
well as its assessment that the fair use defense was viable under Campbell's treatment of
parodies.
In this case, we have found that to the extent Suntrust suffers injury from [the
parodic novel's] putative infringement of its copyright in [Gone with the Wind],
such harm can adequately be remedied through an award of monetary damages.
Moreover, under the present state of the record, it appears that a viable fair use
defense is available. Thus, the issuance of the injunction was at odds with the
shared principles of the First Amendment and the copyright law, acting as a prior
restraint on speech because the public had not had access to [defendant's] ideas
or viewpoint in the form of expression that she chose.
Id. at 1277.
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factors are non-exclusive, 296 despite a judicial history since 1976
indicating otherwise. As such, a court could choose to consider First
Amendment values outside of the listed factors. But there is also room
for the First Amendment within the standard four factors. Slight
adjustments to the courts' approach to the factors would be needed, to
be sure, but those adjustments do not pose an insurmountable hurdle.
The plain language of section 107 tells us that the purpose and
character of a use is much wider than considerations of commercial
nature and nonprofit educational purposes - and not just because
those considerations are part of a dependent "including" clause that
could "swallow" the illustrative uses also provided in section 107.297
The commercial nature of a use cannot be interpreted as the opposite
of a nonprofit educational purpose, as the two are simply not
opposites. Moreover, as set forth in Part III.D. above, the legislative
history of the "commercial" use language is virtually non-existent,
indicating only that it was added to placate the education lobby rather
than to vindicate a significant policy interest. 298 Analysis of the
purpose and character of a use should not be constrained by the
additional language related to the commercial nature of a use.
And while the Court in Campbell moved lower courts away from
a myopic view of the purpose and character of a use as being a simple
question of profit motive, its emphasis on "transformative" use has
introduced another form of myopia that threatens the viability of fair
use as a protector of free speech. A broader vision of the purpose and
character of a use, one which respects Campbell but treats its
emphasis on transformative use as only one facet of the inquiry,
would do much to invigorate fair use with free speech sensitivity.
A. Expanding Purpose and Character Beyond "Transformative"
Uses
The Supreme Court's guidance in Campbell has created its own
potential conflict between the First Amendment and fair use. With the
current emphasis on transformative uses, allegations of fair use via
reproduction, rather than transformation, immediately lose the first
element of the fair use battle, regardless of the contribution of those
reproductions to public discourse or other beneficial purpose. As
Rebecca Tushnet recently argued, free speech values may be
promoted via reproduction of works just as those values may be
296. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
297. See supra note 24 for the full text of section 107. See also supra Part IV.B.4.
298. See supra Part 11.D.
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advanced via transformation of works.299 She discusses the value of
copying and dissemination to audiences, an access and public
discourse value, as well the value to speakers, including values of
self-expression, persuasion, and affirmation, all of which fall within
the self-realization interest promoted through protection of core
speech. None of those values inheres only in transformation or
original speech. Even Melville Nimmer, the ultimate progenitor of the
Court's assertion that copyright's internal safeguards prevent a clash
with free speech,3 °0 clearly articulated the important point that free
speech need not be original in order to be protected.30 1 The Court
itself implicitly recognized this issue in Cohen v. California when it
protected the relatively inarticulate, and likely unoriginal, statement
on Cohen's jacket.30 2
Although in Campbell the Court emphasized the value of a
transformative use in supporting copyright's internal purpose of
promoting science and the arts, it did not foreclose the breadth of the
"breathing space" guaranteed within fair use.30 3 Nor did the Court say
that the transformative nature of a use was the ultimate question under
the first factor. Rather, the Court highlighted transformative uses as a
category potentially invested with a public benefit.
If the emphasis on "transformative" uses in Campbell is viewed
as a proxy for a wider public interest inquiry, rather than a category to
299. Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and
How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L. J. 535, 562-82 (2004); Volokh, supra note 6, at 725-27.
See also Laura G. Lape, Transforming Fair Use. The Productive Use Factor in Fair Use
Doctrine, 58 ALB. L. REV. 677, 713 (1995) ("The productive use doctrine, by discounting the
benefits of access, and refusing to weigh them along with the benefits of creation, unnecessarily
narrows the focus of inquiry under the first factor of section 107").
300. See Netanel, supra note 6, at 7-12.
301. See, e.g., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 685-86 (Leonard W.
Levy et al. eds., 1986) (including an entry on copyright, written by Mel Nimmer, wherein
Nimmer agreed that there was a conflict between the First Amendment and the copyright laws,
due in pan to the fact that "[n]othing in the First Amendment limits the freedom protected
thereunder to speech that is original with the speaker," but wherein he also pointed to the
distinction between ideas and expression within copyright as the means by which the conflict is
resolved, claiming that "'ideas' lie in the domain of the First Amendment, so that copyright may
not be claimed therein, but that the form of 'expression' of ideas may be the subject of
copyright, notwithstanding the First Amendment.").
302. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). Similarly, when the N.Y. Times wished
to reprint portions of the "Pentagon Papers," the fact that the works were not original to the
Times did not factor into the Court's decision on First Amendment grounds, and neither did the
fact that the author of those written works (the government) objected to their publication. See
N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). Accord Tushnet, supra note 299, at 563-
64; McJohn, supra note 81, at 109.
303. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). See supra text
accompanying notes 276-278.
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be pursued for its own sake, the broadening of the first factor would
create a window through which fair use could truly protect free
speech. The Eldred opinion instructs courts to construe copyright's
internal safeguards to accommodate First Amendment concerns. °4 A
broader interpretation of Campbell that looks at "transformation" as
an example of a public benefit, not a stand-alone inquiry, would help
courts do just that.
Public benefit via speech creation and dissemination spans a
broader reach than transformative uses only. Mere reproduction and
dissemination can create public benefit not otherwise created by the
original work, such as in the case of (future Senator) Allan Cranston's
preparation and distribution of a translation of Adolf Hitler's Mein
Kampf Cranston's purpose - certainly beneficial to the public - was
to combat the effect of the selectively edited, and misleading,
translation officially available in the United States through Hitler's
publisher.30 5 Cranston lost the copyright infringement case brought by
Hitler's publisher in 1939.306 Under the fair use analysis applied by
many courts today, he would likely lose again because his use would
be classified as both commercial and, more damning, non-
transformative. A better analysis is warranted. Were a similar
situation to arise today, someone in Cranston's position would have
no confidence that the First Amendment would even be considered in
connection with a defense to copyright infringement.
If my argument is accepted and Campbell's "transformative" use
is read as a proxy for a broader vision of uses imbued with public
benefit, which would allow fair use to perform a First Amendment
purpose, the result would likely be different. The first factor of
purpose and character would favor Cranston, even though the use was
a reproduction rather than a transformation. The public benefit
provided by an accurate translation of portions of Hitler's book that
were edited from the American edition, specifically portions related to
Hitler's plan for the world, would fulfill the First Amendment
purpose of dissemination of information and expression that can assist
304. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 187, 221 n.24 (2003) ("[lI]t is appropriate to construe
copyright's internal safeguards to accommodate First Amendment concerns."). The Court cited
as authority United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 78 (1994), where it stated: "It
is ... incumbent upon us to read the statute to eliminate [serious constitutional] doubts so long
as such a reading is not plainly contrary to the intent of Congress."
305. See Anthony 0. Miller, Court Halted Dime Edition of 'Mein Kampf'; Cranston Tells
How Hitler Sued Him and Won, L.A. TtMES, Feb. 14, 1988, at 4.
306. See Houghton Mifflin Co. v. Noram Publ'g Co., Inc., 28 F. Supp. 676 (S.D.N.Y.
1939).
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the public in its evaluation of governmental policy. And as I argue
below, the commercial sale of the translation should not factor into
purpose and character of the use, and should instead be reserved for
the fourth factor.
The second factor, nature of the copyrighted work, would likely
favor the publisher. The third factor, amount and substantiality of the
portion used, might still favor infringement rather than fair use, since
the copying would be both quantitatively and qualitatively substantial.
On the other hand, a court's consideration of the public interest in
dissemination of Hitler's actual plans for European and world
domination, including the powerful effect of hearing about those
plans in his own words, would help mitigate any damage this factor
would do to Cranston's fair use defense, since significant copying
would be necessary to accomplish the valuable purpose of the use.
The fourth factor, market effects, might still favor the publisher. But
given that Cranston's translation focused on the aggressive, power-
hungry side of Hitler's vision for the world as expressed in Mein
Kampf which was missing from the official version available from
Hitler's publisher, analysis of the likely effect on the market for the
official version might have instead resulted in the fourth factor's
being neutral, or at least only slightly damaging to Cranston. 30 7 And
even though Cranston's book was sold rather than given away, the
fourth factor might still be neutral because Cranston's translation was
not a real substitute for the official version.
Altogether, consideration of a broad public interest in the first
factor, including speech interests, would give Cranston a fighting
chance of succeeding in his fair use defense. But if the first factor
remains limited to transformative uses and commercial purposes,
speech interests such as those raised in the Cranston-Mein Kampf
situation are unlikely to be considered within fair use.
B. Eliminating Commerciality from the Purpose and Character
Inquiry
The continued emphasis on commercial use within a doctrine
ostensibly sensitive to free speech concerns means that the courts'
definition of commercial use retains vital importance. In its fair use
decisions, the Supreme Court's guidance has been limited. In both
Sony and Harper & Row, commercial use was characterized as being
307. See Miller, supra note 305.
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opposed to non-profit use.30 8 In Harper & Row the Court went even
further, stating that benefiting from copyrighted material "without
paying the customary price" meant a commercial use. 30 9 That
definition could easily include noncommercial, nonprofit uses.
Moreover, the reasoning is circular: if the use is fair, then there is no
infringement and no need for authorization or a fee - there is no
customary price for a fair use. Even Campbell, which criticized the
appellate court's analysis of commercial use, did little to refine the
analysis. 3
10
This leaves the commercial use inquiry in the first factor directly
in conflict with the Court's First Amendment instruction as to the
appropriate categorization of speech when preparing to apply greater
or lesser protection to types of speech. As outlined in Part II.B.2
above, speech does not lose core First Amendment protection due to a
profit motive or other commercial connection, such as paid
placement. 311 The lower protection afforded to commercial speech
arises only when the speech does no more than propose a commercial
transaction or evinces a thoroughly commercial character through an
aggregation of elements, including format, content, and purpose.312
By disfavoring commercial uses on the basis of a profit motive or
other economic purpose, current fair use analysis discriminates
against core speech simply because the speaker disseminated the
speech for the speaker's own benefit.
In addition to the categorical clash above, as well as the conflict
of the profit-nonprofit analysis with many of the "more fair" types of
uses such as criticism and reporting, the continued emphasis on
commercial or profit-based uses duplicates the concern of the fourth
factor, market effects. When a use is deemed to be of a commercial
nature due to its failure to pay a license fee 3 13 or its presence in a
commercial market in competition with the original work, those
considerations really do not address "purpose and character." Instead,
they address the market for or value of the copyrighted work. When a
use is commercial because it affects copyright's utilitarian, incentive-
based structure, the use implicates the copyright owner's interest in
the market for or value of the work. The fourth factor is explicitly
308. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449 (1984); Harper
& Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985).
309. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562.
310. See supra notes 267-272 and accompanying text.
311. See supra Part 1I.B.2.
312. Id.
313. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562.
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concerned with the effect of the use on the market for, and value of,
the plaintiffs work.314 Market effects should not be double-counted
through the first factor. And when courts do consider "commercial
nature" so broadly in the first factor as to engulf all for-profit
enterprise, the commercial nature of a use bears a heavy burden on a
defendant in two of the four factors. This skews a court's analysis.
315
As an example, consider Harper & Row. The case might come
out the same way even after eliminating the commercial-
noncommercial use distinction. But the First Amendment interest in
news reporting and information dissemination would have received
more attention if The Nation's profit-oriented status had not been used
as one "strike" against fair use, with the derivative market counted as
an additional "strike., 316 The First Amendment interest could have
been considered head-on if the article's clear news-reporting,
noncommercial speech status had been accounted for and if the
article's profit-making status had not been turned against it. I do not
argue that the result in this particular case would necessarily have
been different under my proposed analysis. 317 That result would
simply have been more defensible within a balancing of First
Amendment and copyright interests. Just as not all news reporting
escapes libel law, not all news reporting will escape copyright law.
We should, however, remain sensitive to the First Amendment in each
analysis.
To further revise and apply the fair use doctrine today to
improve the protection of freedom of speech in coordination with fair
314. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2000) ("the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work").
315. See William W. Fisher 111, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1659, 1672-73 (1988) (referring to this phenomenon as "double-counting"); see also Jay Dratler,
Jr., Distilling the Witches' Brew of Fair Use in Copyright Law, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 233, 302
(1988) ("Allowing market considerations to dominate the 'purpose' factor, as well as the critical
'market effect' factor might give them more weight than Congress actually intended."). Laura
Lape argues that even after the Court refocused attention in the first fair use factor, emphasizing
transformative uses, the balance is still skewed:
[t]o the extent that productive use is equated with non-superseding use,
consideration of productive use under the first factor permits the fourth factor,
market impact, to be counted twice.... This is the case because a superseding
use - a use that replaces the copyrighted work in the marketplace - is precisely
what satisfies the fourth factor.
Lape, supra note 299, at 715.
316. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566-67.
317. The effect on the market for serialization rights of Ford's memoir was likely so great,
the use of the "heart" of the work might have been so significant, and the fact that the
publication was purposely timed to scoop the previously unpublished work and article might
have been so unjustified - that all might have coalesced to reach the same result.
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use's role in carrying out the constitutional aim of copyright,
Congress should eliminate the commerciality of a use from the
purpose and character inquiry. Specifically, Congress should delete
from the first fair use factor the express inclusion of "whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes." The language, as applied by the courts, skews the fair use
analysis away from the more core questions of public benefit and true
market harm to the plaintiff. 318 Moreover, it is not consistently
318. Even without Congressional action, the Court could choose to redefine the
"commercial" nature of a use within the first factor to create the other end of the spectrum from
"nonprofit educational" use. This would move lower courts further in the direction begun by
Campbell by making the commerciality of a use an even less influential factor in most cases.
Accord Tushnet, supra note 6, at 70-74. By creating a spectrum of uses, the Court would
eliminate the illogical contraposition of commercial uses with non-profit educational uses. See
supra text accompanying notes 297-298. For example, photocopying a musical work in order
that an entire school choir may sing it at a free performance is noncommercial and educational,
and yet that use might completely supplant a significant market for the work, particularly if the
work has been prepared with special emphasis on the youth choral market.
I would not suggest redrawing the line in the first factor at commercial speech (rather
than commercial use) because I think the "hardy" nature of commercial speech justifies the
distinction. See supra note 66. Cf Tushnet, supra note 6, at 70-74. 1 would suggest placing
commercial speech at one end of the spectrum in pursuit of another goal - to redirect courts
away from overly-harsh conclusions on the basis of commercial, profit-oriented purposes for the
second user's expression/speech. My goal would simply be to introduce a more comprehensive
balance of interests by introducing First Amendment principles. Within fair use, a balancing of
various factors is already manifest - introducing a spectrum of commerciality would simply add
to the mix without discounting the First Amendment's careful protection of all kinds of uses,
including commercial ones. Placing commercial speech at one end of the spectrum could be
appealing to the judiciary in light of the Court's prior determination that some subordination of
commercial speech is acceptable even within a wholly First-Amendment focused analysis. And
creating a spectrum, versus the current false dichotomy, more appropriately focuses the courts
on the wider range of interests implicated by the first factor, the purpose and character of a use.
But if we pay attention to the rationale behind commercial speech doctrine, on the
other hand, a difficulty with this proposal could arise. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,
517 U.S. 484, 504 (1996) (plurality opinion) (stating that speech prohibitions "serv[ing] an end
unrelated consumer protection .... rarely survive constitutional review"); City of Cincinnati v.
Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 424 (1993) (invalidating a ban on commercial
newsracks when noncommercial newsracks were permitted, because the "categorical ban on
commercial newsracks place[s] too much importance on the distinction between commercial and
noncommercial speech [and because] in this case, the distinction bears no relationship
whatsoever to the particular interests that the city has asserted. It is therefore an impermissible
means of responding to the city's admittedly legitimate interests."); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v.
Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 96 (1977) (allowing the government less leeway in
regulating commercial speech when its restrictions do not take aim at the "commercial aspect of
[the speech] - with offerors communicating offers to offerees."). Without evidence that uses in
"commercial speech" are more harmful to the copyright owner, i.e., less fair, than uses in
noncommercial speech (including noncommercial speech distributed for a profit), and without a
tie to the transactional aspect to commercial speech, the use of a commercial speech distinction
within fair use could be invalid. It is difficult to argue that use of a copyrighted work in
advertising material is generally (categorically, without analysis of the particular use) more
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applied. If the explicit commercial/nonprofit element of the first
factor were eliminated, courts could then feel freer to focus on other
elements of the purpose and character of a use and leave profiteering
(via profit usurpation) for the fourth factor.319
The fair use analysis grew from case law dealing almost
exclusively with defendants who had made commercial use of the
work, and the addition of the language related to commercial use
appears to have been a last-minute palliative for the educational
lobby. As such, its inclusion should never have been given significant
emphasis by the courts. The courts' failure to engage in a real
evaluation of the meaning of commerciality and its relevance to the
purpose and character of a use disserves the individual, case-by-case
balancing of interests that courts performed before the 1976 Act and
that Congress intended to continue after the Act. Moreover,
comparing the commercial speech/core speech line in First
Amendment jurisprudence with the commercial use/noncommercial
use line in copyright fair use demonstrates a divergence within fair
use from First Amendment principles. Such a divergence is
unacceptable in light of the Court's emphasis on fair use as a
protector of free speech interests. Eliminating commerciality from the
first fair use factor will help minimize the conflict between the fair
use analysis and First Amendment jurisprudence.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court relies on fair use as one of the primary internal
safeguards for the freedom of speech within copyright, although it has
harmful to protected interests of a copyright owner than the use of that same work in a book,
movie, educational text, etc. So although the distinction itself would not be controversial, in that
it mirrors an accepted distinction within First Amendment jurisprudence, there is weak, if not
nonexistent, theoretical support for discriminating within fair use on the basis that a use occurs
in commercial speech. As such, the Court's statement in Campbell that "[t]he use, for example,
of a copyrighted work to advertise a product, even in a parody, will be entitled to less
indulgence under the first factor of the fair use enquiry than the sale of a parody for its own
sake" also seems suspect, at best, under the Court's own commercial speech jurisprudence.
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 585 (1994). Accord Tushnet, supra note 6,
at 70-74.
319. I prefer elimination of the first-factor consideration of commercial use over
redefinition of commercial use as commercial speech for multiple reasons. Some of those
reasons relate to the modem treatment of commercial speech, see supra note 318, and others
relate to the internal considerations within fair use. Avoiding the skewing of the fair use analysis
by weighing profitable uses in both the first and fourth fair use factors would create a more
nuanced analysis of fair use. See supra text accompanying notes 313-315. In addition, the
elimination of commercial use from the first factor would bring current doctrine closer to the
broad, open balancing accommodated in the pre-1976 model of fair use.
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not explained its reliance. There is no evidence of a First Amendment
purpose or structure to the doctrine, and little case law supports the
Court's position. Courts rarely consider fair use defenses invested
with significant free speech interests. Given the direct conflict
between copyright and the First Amendment and the strong public
benefit underlying each, we cannot completely resolve the difficulty
presented by such cases. No accommodation to copyright fair use can
be certain to always rescue a free speech interest from a claim of
copyright infringement. The Court could admit the lack of a real
connection between fair use and free speech and provide separate
First Amendment review in appropriate cases. Or, if the Court
continues to rely on fair use as a bulwark against separate First
Amendment scrutiny of copyright, then the Court and Congress owe a
duty to the First Amendment to make fair use and its analytical
framework operate in accord with First Amendment principles rather
than in discord. If we do not provide separate First Amendment
review or reform fair use to encourage courts to consider a broad
range of public benefits and private purposes within the balance of the
first factor, we will do a great disservice to the Constitution and future
litigants.
* * *
